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Abstract
The purpose of this study is fourfold:first, to summarise the current stateof knowledge about chronic pov-
erty in South Africa; second, to describe
the range of existing governmental and
civil society initiatives which address
chronic poverty; third, to identify chal-
lenges to addressing chronic poverty in
South Africa; and fourth, to identify
themes for further research.
For the purposes of this study, house-
holds or individuals are understood to be
in chronic poverty when their condition of
poverty endures over a period of time.
Different researchers propose different
time periods as characteristic of chronic
poverty (for example, six months, ten
years); this is usually taken to mean that
the household or individual remains
beneath the poverty line for all or virtually
all of this period. Alternatively, and per-
haps more meaningfully, chronic poverty
can be understood as the inability of
households or individuals, perhaps for lack
of opportunity, to better their circum-
stances over time or to sustain themselves
through difficult times. Chronic poverty
can be a function of an individual’s char-
acteristics (for example, elderly, disabled),
or of the environment (for example, sus-
tained periods of high unemployment,
landlessness), or of a combination of the
two. Indeed, a common scenario in South
Africa involves the coincidence of poor
health, meagre education, and fractured
families, on the one hand, with skewed
resource distribution, inadequate infra-
structure, and scarce employment opportu-
nities, on the other. The combination is
more than sufficient to trap many people in
poverty.
To date, there has been only one set of
data collected in South Africa which allows
an inter-temporal comparison among the
same households. This is the KwaZulu-
Natal Income Dynamics Study (KIDS)
which, as the name implies, covers only
one of South Africa’s nine provinces.
Because this data set and the analyses
based upon it are unique, we discuss it at
length. One of the important findings from
the KIDS data is that 22 per cent of the
1 200 African households that were sur-
veyed were poor in both 1993 and 1998.
This represents about two thirds of all
households that were poor in 1993, and
one half of those that were poor in 1998,
showing that at least half of those house-
holds that are poor, are chronically poor.
Another interesting finding is that ‘ultra-
poverty’ is not synonymous with chronic
poverty. In other words, a household that
is just below the poverty line in one period
is no more likely to move above the
poverty line in the next period than a
household that started off much further
below the poverty line. A key determinant
of whether a household stays in poverty,
escapes from poverty, or falls into poverty,
is how that household fares in terms of
employment. One of the surprising find-
ings from the KIDS data set was the degree
of employment volatility experienced by
households. Notwithstanding the contribu-
tion of household income sources other
than formal sector employment, employ-
ment apparently makes the difference
between survival and total destitution, but
less commonly associated with the differ-
ence between being poor and not being
poor. Income sources outside the formal
sector may make the difference between
survival and total destitution, but are less
likely to determine whether an individual
or household is poor or not.
The KIDS-based studies as well as other
poverty analyses allow us to identify
groups especially likely to be chronically
poor. These include rural households,
households headed by women, households
effectively headed by elderly people, and
households headed by former (retrenched)
farm workers. Over the next 10 years,
however, AIDS orphans and households
directly affected by AIDS will probably
figure as the most prominent category of
people trapped in chronic poverty.
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The paper goes on to survey the various
anti-poverty measures of government and
civil society. In terms of expenditure, the
government’s social security system is by
far the largest anti-poverty instrument in
the country, and probably one of the more
functional. As a gross generalisation,
government-led developmental initiatives
have not proven to be terribly successful,
not least because of the intrinsic difficulty
of the task they set themselves.
A number of challenges face govern-
ment and civil society in addressing pov-
erty in general and chronic poverty in
particular. Among these are: first, the
absence of a coherent anti-poverty strat-
egy, and particularly one that takes into
account the distinction between chronic
poverty and transitory poverty; second, the
bleak prospects for growth in formal sector
employment in the medium term, together
with general uncertainty as to how to
improve support to the small, medium and
micro-enterprise (SMME) sector; and third,
the HIV/AIDS epidemic, the effects of
which will probably be far more apparent
in the next 15 years than they are at
present.
The paper concludes with suggested
priority areas for further research.
vi
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As the paragraphs quoted abovereveal, there are at least two dis-tinct strands within the govern-
ment’s approach to addressing the
country’s massive poverty problem. On the
one hand, there is a system of social grants
emanating from the Department of Social
Development that aim to prevent certain
people from slipping into total destitution.
On the other hand, there is an avowed
intention by this department, as well as by
other departments, to deliberately move
away from ‘welfarism’ and towards ‘devel-
opment’, by which people will be empow-
ered to lift themselves out of poverty.
While in principle these strands are fully
complementary, in practice they compete
over scarce resources, both financial and
human. Striking the best possible balance
between them is a difficult and subtle task.
We submit that an understanding of
chronic poverty – where individuals or
households remain trapped in poverty over
time – may go some way towards helping
strike this balance, as well as informing the
over-arching anti-poverty strategies of
both government and civil society.
This study marks the first stage of a
multi-year research programme into
chronic poverty in South Africa. The
research programme is a joint effort be-
tween the Programme for Land and Agrar-
ian Studies (PLAAS) of the School of
Government, University of the Western
Cape, and the Chronic Poverty Research
Centre (CPRC) based at the University of
Manchester. Similar research programmes
are simultaneously under way in partner-
ship with the CPRC in Uganda, India, and
Sri Lanka. Funding for the entire multi-
country research framework is provided by
the Department for International Develop-
ment (DFID) of the United Kingdom.
The objective of this study is fourfold:
first, to summarise the current state of
knowledge about chronic poverty in South
Africa; second, to describe the range of
existing governmental and civil society
initiatives which address poverty and, by
extension, chronic poverty; third, to iden-
tify challenges to addressing chronic
poverty in South Africa; and fourth, to
identify themes for further research.
For the purposes of this study, a house-
hold or individual is understood to be in
chronic poverty when the condition of
poverty endures over a period of time.
Different researchers propose alternative
1. Introduction and synopsis
The Government recognises that the current grant amounts are not
sufficient to address large-scale poverty, deprivation and inequality in
South Africa, but will continue to increase spending on social assistance
as resource constraints allow....
The department has been systematically undergoing a transformation
process. We have changed the paradigm within which we operate from
welfarism to social development as reflected in our change of name. We
seek to promote services and programmes that enable people to move
out of poverty.
Minister for Social Development, Dr Zola Skweyiya, Budget
Vote Speech to the National Assembly, 3rd April 2001
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time periods as characteristic of chronic
poverty (for example, six months, ten
years), usually taken to mean that the
household or individual remains beneath
the poverty line for all or virtually all of
this period. Alternatively, and perhaps
more meaningfully, chronic poverty can be
understood as inability or lack of opportu-
nity on the part of households or individu-
als to better their circumstances over time
or to sustain themselves through difficult
periods. As such, chronic poverty can be a
function of the individual’s characteristics
(for example, elderly, disabled), or of the
environment (for example, sustained
periods of high unemployment, landless-
ness), or very probably of both. Indeed, a
common scenario in South Africa involves
the coincidence of poor health, meagre
education, and fractured families, on the
one hand, with skewed resource distribu-
tion, inadequate infrastructure, and scarce
employment opportunities on the other.
The combination is more than sufficient to
trap many people in poverty, that is, to
make them chronically poor.
Chronic poverty is sometimes concep-
tualised as inter-generational poverty,
meaning that children from poor house-
holds are likely to become poor adults,
whose children will in turn risk remaining
in poverty, and so on. In South Africa, the
question of whether poverty tends to have
an inter-generational dimension is compli-
cated by the fact that until very recently
the policy of apartheid cruelly limited the
opportunities available to the majority
black population. Almost all poverty was
inter-generational, because colonialism
and apartheid left little room for it to be
otherwise. This is not to say that there was
no mobility in African, coloured, and
Indian communities, but it took place
under a system that was engineered to
make this difficult. This system was of
course formally abolished in 1994. Too
few years have elapsed since then to
enable us to know to what extent poverty
is still an inheritable condition, but initial
indications are that, for the majority, it is.
Unravelling the multiple factors that
contribute to both medium-term chronic
poverty, and chronic poverty in an inter-
generation sense, is the primary objective
of the research programme of which this
paper is but a modest first step.
Chronic poverty as a distinct manifesta-
tion of poverty has not, by and large,
received much focused attention in South
Africa. This may be due in part to the fact
that there have been few longitudinal data
sets collected in South Africa which would
serve as a rigorous basis for distinguishing
the chronically poor from the episodically
poor. On the other hand, the lack of spe-
cific attention to chronic poverty may be
due to the huge scale of South Africa’s
poverty and the severity of its inequality,
engendering the perception that most of
South Africa’s poor are chronically poor. Be
that as it may, there has been a recent
upsurge in interest in chronic poverty in
South Africa, and beyond this there exists a
large and rich literature on poverty gener-
ally from which much can be extrapolated
about chronic poverty specifically.
In South Africa there has been only one
data set collected to date allowing an inter-
temporal comparison among the same
households. This is the KwaZulu-Natal
Income Dynamics Study (KIDS) which, as
the name implies, covers only one of
South Africa’s nine provinces. The data set
comprises information on the same 1 200
households for both 1993 and 1998, a
time-span of five years. Because this data
set and the analyses based upon it are
unique, we discuss them at length. One of
the important findings from the KIDS data
is that 22 per cent of the 1 200 households
that were surveyed were poor in both
periods. This represents about two thirds of
all households that were poor in 1993, and
one half of those that were poor in 1998,
meaning that at least half of those house-
holds that are poor are chronically poor.
Another interesting finding is that ‘ultra-
poverty’ is not synonymous with chronic
poverty. In other words, a household that
is just below the poverty line in one period
is no more likely to move above the
poverty line in the next period than a
household that started off much further
below the poverty line.
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1. Introduction and synopsis
Whereas the KIDS data set mainly helps
us examine the incidence of chronic
poverty in terms of income poverty, other
dimensions of poverty – including subjective
ones – are also important. If in the context
of quantitative analyses chronic poverty is
understood as the persistence of income-
poverty or expenditure-poverty over time
then, in the experiential approach, we
understand chronic poverty to be the
persistence over time of the subjective
state of poverty. However, there are at least
two other ways in which qualitative and
participatory studies can help us under-
stand chronic poverty. Firstly, these studies
can assist us to understand whether and
how people experience the idea of poverty
traps, and how they conceptualise the
barriers to escaping them. Secondly,
studies such as these can enrich our under-
standing of the causes of chronic poverty,
and of the conventional measures of
income-poverty. In this regard, drawing on
the South African literature on poverty, we
examine aspects of the experience of
poverty such as vulnerability, social exclu-
sion, gender oppression, lack of access to
services and so on. The literature confirms
that many poor people feel resigned to
poverty – that is, to being chronically poor
– and also that many of the day-to-day
experiences that contribute to the percep-
tion of being poor are attributable to the
economic or social environment, over
which the poor person has little or no
control.
One of the goals of this overview study
is to try to identify different categories of
households or people that might be espe-
cially susceptible to being caught in
chronic poverty. Drawing both on pub-
lished analyses of the KIDS data, and on
other contributions to the literature on
poverty in South Africa, a number of
vulnerable groups are identified, including
rural households generally, women-headed
households, the disabled, retrenched farm
workers, the elderly, and so on. For each
of these categories, it is important to
understand why its members are prone to
chronic poverty. Some of these reasons are
fairly self-evident (for example, the disa-
bled have more difficulty finding employ-
ment), while others are less obvious and
are rooted in the specific situation of South
Africa (for example, retrenched farm
workers who are forced to relocate and
thus sever their social support networks).
In addition, very rough first approxima-
tions are provided as to how many chroni-
cally poor households or individuals there
might be in each of these categories. The
purpose of this exercise is to provide some
guidance for both policy and further
research as to where the problem of
chronic poverty is most severe. A sobering
conclusion from this section is that, over
the next 10 years or so, AIDS orphans and
households directly affected by AIDS will
probably become the categories with the
largest number of individuals or house-
holds in a state of chronic poverty.
South Africa has many initiatives in
place to address poverty, emanating both
from government and civil society. Few of
these can be said to be aimed specifically
at chronic poverty, not least because
chronic poverty is not an analytical cat-
egory used by policy makers or corporate
donors or NGOs in the design of their
programmes. Nonetheless, we can broadly
distinguish two types of anti-poverty
initiatives, those that create a safety net,
and those with a developmental goal. We
attempt to survey, albeit incompletely, the
activities of government and civil society
in both of these areas. One striking finding
is that the lion’s share of anti-poverty
expenditure in South Africa consists of
government spending on the array of
social security grants and subsidised health
care. In terms of expenditure that is di-
rected towards the poor, this category
dwarfs all others. Indeed, the social grant
system has become less of a net devised to
catch an unfortunate few in times of
temporary distress than a major commit-
ment to helping a large fraction of the
population over extended periods of time.
The next largest category of expenditure is
that of a safety-net character from the
private sector, largely through work-related
insurance (for example, unemployment
insurance), as well as private sector
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support for charitable causes. Develop-
mental initiatives from government and
from the private sector tie for third place.
These initiatives include support for small,
medium and micro-enterprises (SMMEs),
as well as support for a variety of other
kinds of community-based income-
generating projects.
One might be tempted to conclude
that, given South Africa’s developmental
priorities, the spending is skewed too far
towards the provision of safety nets. While
this may be the case, it is a system that
works relatively well. By contrast, spend-
ing money on development has proven
rather difficult, and spending that money
effectively has proven even more difficult.
Among the problems that inhibit anti-
poverty initiatives is the lack of a coherent
anti-poverty strategy. The process of
developing such a strategy might help
to clarify the situation and help to define
the needs of specific categories of poor
people, such as the categories of
chronically poor people described above.
Another problem is the bugbear of inter-
departmental co-ordination, in which some
progress is perhaps being made via the
recently introduced Integrated Sustainable
Rural Development Strategy. A third
serious problem is the fact that government
employees do not appear well-suited to the
task of kick-starting entrepreneurs. The
efforts of government and civil society in
this area are complicated by the fact that
the trend of declining formal sector em-
ployment that began in the early 1990s has
continued unabated through the second
half of the decade. Meanwhile, it is not at
all clear what the absorptive capacity of
the SMME sector is. Rural areas are likely
to have relatively low capacity in this
regard. The solution that has been offered
by way of the newly-revised land redistri-
bution programme is likely to promise
more than it can deliver. Threatening all of
the good intentions of government and
civil society is the prospect of the worse-
ning AIDS epidemic. The epidemic is
likely to have devastating effects, and
these will extend well beyond those
unfortunate enough to be infected. How
the epidemic will impact on the prospects
for escaping poverty, and how it will force
government and civil society to redirect
their efforts, remains to be seen. Another
major threat is looming cuts in the public
service, which could increase the numbers
of unemployed people much more quickly
than new opportunities can be created
through SMMEs.
While much is known already about
chronic poverty in South Africa, there
remains a great need for further research.
This is so not least because of the fluidity
of the socio-economic environment, and of
government policy. The paper concludes
with a list of identified research priorities
to help guide the future course of this
research programme. A key challenge will
be to conduct the research in such a man-
ner as to derive tangible lessons for policy
formation.
5
Chapter One: Introduction and synopsis
Firstly, South Africa’s historicalcircumstances have shaped thepresent configuration of poverty and
opportunities along racial lines. Disadvan-
taged groups were systematically left with
relatively little in the way of land and other
resources, were not afforded education of
a quality comparable to that of whites, and
were compelled to adopt coping strategies
– such as spatially-divided households –
which have left a complicated and painful
social legacy. Secondly, developments in
the six years since the first racially-inclusive
democratic elections in 1994 have not
augured well for poverty reduction.
The calculated adoption by the African
National Congress (ANC)-led government
of a fiscally conservative market-oriented
economic strategy has failed to halt the
decline in formal sector employment that
began in the early 1990s. Government’s
commitment to fiscal stringency and
downsizing of the public service have
arguably exacerbated the situation of the
poor, notwithstanding the importance of
more long-term considerations. Improved
provision of infrastructure and services has
been the main positive development for
which the post-1994 government can take
credit.
The legacies of colonialism and
apartheid
The single most significant factor distin-
guishing South Africa from other African
countries is its experience of colonialism
and apartheid. This holds no less for the
causes and incidence of its poverty. Euro-
pean colonisation began in the 17th century
with Dutch and Huguenot settlement in the
Cape. Initially, the impact of white settle-
ment was mainly limited to the Cape, and
was mainly at the expense of Khoikhoi
pastoralists (Ross 1999). With the expansion
of white settlement northwards and east-
wards, and the arrival of British settlers in
Xhosaland and Natal as an outgrowth of
British imperialism, pressure on Bantu-
speaking African groups became increas-
ingly intense. The most direct aspect of
this pressure was the dispossession of land
by whites, as a result of which African
farmers were forced to either retreat to
other areas (such as Basutoland), become
sharecroppers (especially on land owned
by whites of British descent), or become
farm labourers (especially on land owned
by farmers of Dutch descent). While
African agriculture continued to thrive
for a time and indeed posed a highly
resented source of direct competition to
white farmers, it was gradually reduced by
further land conquests, as well as efforts to
curb sharecropping (Keegan 1986; Trapido
1986).
In much of the eastern third of the
country, the late 18th and early 19th centu-
ries witnessed social and geographic
upheaval due to wars between competing
African polities. Livestock diseases of
European origin had enormous implica-
tions for African populations, for whom
2. Historical background and
present economic context
Introduction
This section seeks to provide historical background as context within
which to place the more specific discussion of chronic poverty that
follows. The presentation is necessarily cursory. It aims to capture two
main themes.
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livestock formed a critical source of suste-
nance. A lung-sickness epizootic struck in
the mid-19th century, and foot-and-mouth
disease and rinderpest struck with particu-
lar force in the 1890s, the latter wiping out
90 per cent of the region’s livestock (Ross
1999).
In the latter half of the 19th century, the
discovery first of diamonds, and then of
gold, changed the situation completely.
One aspect of the new situation was the
rapidly growing demand for black
mineworkers to work the mines of the
Transvaal.1 Various white governments
introduced laws and policies to facilitate
the supply of this labour. In particular, the
Natives Land Act of 1913 formalised the
distinction between the African reserves
and white farming areas, prohibiting
Africans from acquiring, owning, and
renting land ‘white’ areas. This had the
effect of limiting their economic options
so severely as to compel many to sell their
labour to the mines and white farms
(Hendricks 1990; Davenport 1987; Bundy
1979). Around that same time, there were
some 180 000 African mineworkers in the
country, of whom around half were from
South Africa, and half from Lesotho,
Swaziland, Mozambique and elsewhere.
Control of Africans’ mobility remained
a high priority for government through
most of the 20th century. The government
sought to balance the ‘legitimate’ demand
for African workers for mines and un-
skilled and semi-skilled work in urban
areas with the desire to keep white settle-
ments insulated from ‘surplus’ Africans.
Since at least the late 19th century, a pattern
emerged whereby Africans or coloureds
were relegated to ‘townships’ adjacent to
white towns. In 1950, as Minister of Native
Affairs, HF Verwoerd (who later became
Prime Minister) introduced the Urban
Labour Preference Policy, along the same
lines as – but more draconian than – the
Natives Urban Areas Act of 1923. One of
the more destructive effects of the system
was to split many families for long periods,
with men working on the mines or in the
cities, and women remaining in the rural
reserves. Meanwhile, conditions in the
reserves deteriorated as more and more
people were forced to settle there. Between
1955 and 1969, population density in the
reserves increased from 60 to 110 persons
per square mile (Simkins 1983, cited in
Delius & Schirmer 2000). Effectively,
many households in so-called rural areas
were (and remain) landless, while many
others were left with tiny amounts of land.
The logical conclusion of this process
came in the 1960s and 1970s, when the
apartheid government ‘elevated’ the status
of the African reserves to ten putatively
self-governing homelands, of which some
were declared independent states. These
homelands were thus set up with their own
legislative assemblies, government depart-
ments, rights to confer citizenship and so
on. The idea of ‘separate development’
was that they would also have their own
economies. However, given that these
reserves comprised only 13 per cent of the
country’s land area, were often geographi-
cally isolated, and had grossly inadequate
infrastructure, this was hardly plausible.
Poorly conceptualised investments in
agricultural irrigation schemes benefited
mainly a few score white development
experts and consultancies. The industrial
decentralisation policy made only some
inroads, but disintegrated rather quickly
once the wage subsidies were removed
after 1994. The main source of employ-
ment within the homelands was no doubt
the public service itself. The homelands
thus had virtually no tax base, and so had
to rely almost entirely on transfers from
the apartheid government. Poor health
care services and vastly inferior ‘Bantu
education’ were among the results. Those
few Africans that did receive a decent
education or health care, usually did so at
mission schools and hospitals. Because of
the dearth of meaningful income-earning
opportunities within the homelands, the
migrant labour system remained one of the
most important survival strategies for
African households, notwithstanding its
high personal costs. As of the early 1970s,
54 per cent of all Africans lived outside of
the homelands in the ‘white’ areas (Butler
et al. 1977).
Coloureds and Indians faced similar but
different forms of discrimination and
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economic oppression. Both groups were
also subject to forced removals, to restric-
tions on movement and settlement, and
were denied the right to vote (except on a
limited basis in the Cape Colony, and then
again, briefly, through the bogus tricameral
Parliament established in 1983). Per capita
spending on education, housing, and
services was marginally higher for
coloureds and Indians than for Africans,
but still significantly inferior to that pro-
vided for whites. A large fraction of
coloureds, concentrated in the Cape, relied
on unskilled and semi-skilled farm work
for sustenance, under conditions somewhat
better than those of their African counter-
parts elsewhere in the country. In the
course of the 20th century, Indians, most of
whose forebears came to South Africa in
the late 1800s as indentured labourers to
work on the sugar plantations of Natal,
diversified their economic activities into a
number of different economic niches,
including trading, manufacturing, and the
professions.
Poverty among whites was not un-
known, though it was on a different scale
from that of other groups. During the 19th
century, most white poverty was associated
with agricultural crises brought on by
epizootics, drought, fluctuating commodity
prices, as well as direct competition from
better capitalised farmers (Bundy 1986). At
the turn of the century, the effects of
rinderpest and drought were compounded
by the South African (‘Anglo-Boer’) War
of 1899–1902. White tenant farmers,
squatters on Crown land, and indebted
landowners were especially vulnerable,
and contributed to the influx of whites to
mining areas and cities in search of em-
ployment immediately after the war.
However, because of the semi-official
policy of maintaining a wage differential
between whites and blacks on the mines,
only a limited number of unskilled whites
were absorbed. Those that remained in the
countryside became ever more dependent
upon African tenants to resuscitate or
maintain production, an indignity which
did much to shape future policy with
respect to the ‘poor white problem’
(Keegan 1986). The main motivation
behind the founding in 1909 of what is
now the Land and Agriculture Bank was to
restore poor whites to the land. Much of
National Party rule from 1948 onwards can
be interpreted as an effort to deal with the
poor white problem, from the rapid expan-
sion of the public service, to ever-more
generous subsidies to white farmers, and
even to provisions against the subdivision
of farm land into so-called sub-economic
units.
Generally speaking, women’s economic
and social status in South Africa, both
black and white, has been largely deter-
mined in relation to men, that is, fathers
and husbands (see, for example, Govender
2000). In some African societies, being
widowed or failing to bear children could
lead to a precipitous drop in the welfare of
a family, depending in large measure on
the forbearance of the (late) husband’s
relatives. In modern times, African women
have struggled under the dual oppression
of racism and sexism, as poignantly cap-
tured in the first-person accounts compiled
in Bozzoli (1991) and Barrett et al. (1985).
Influx controls and the migrant labour
system in particular contributed to the
African woman’s burden, as will be dis-
cussed in more detail in a later section.
Women farm workers are paid on average
well below their male counterparts, and are
often preferred to men particularly because
of their vulnerability (Marcus 1989).
Among white women, a gradual increase
in political inclusion and workforce partici-
pation paralleled but lagged behind that
which occurred in Europe and North
America.
Different South African communities
had different social safety nets, and these
changed in different ways over the years.
Among African households, the most
significant safety net was traditionally the
extended family and informal social
networks of reciprocity. The extended
family lent a degree of resilience in the
face of calamities that, for example, al-
lowed African households in the southern
Highveld to recover more quickly from the
rinderpest and drought of the late 19th
century (Keegan 1986). Over the course of
the 20th century, however, the growing
2. Historical background and present economic context
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dependence on urban-based incomes
and the increasingly limited agricultural
resources in rural areas meant the decline
of reciprocal and redistributive rural
relationships, within which poorer house-
holds could expect cattle loans, work
opportunities and other forms of assistance
from better-off neighbours (Delius &
Schirmer 2000).
For whites, as already indicated, the
state very early on assumed responsibility
for addressing the problem of poverty. In
addition, benevolent societies of various
kinds were established in many towns, and
the Dutch Reformed Church sponsored
charitable programmes to help address the
situation of poor whites.
Socio-economic policies since
1994
On the eve of the first racially-inclusive
democratic elections in 1994, the ANC
embarked on drafting its vision of how it
would transform the country. This strategy
was the Reconstruction and Development
Programme (RDP), which was defined by
its authors as follows:
The RDP is an integrated, coherent
socio-economic policy framework. It
seeks to mobilise all our people and
our country’s resources toward the
final eradication of apartheid and
the building of a democratic, non-
racial and non-sexist future (ANC
1994).
The initial policy framework document
spelled out the vast number of changes the
future ANC-led government would seek to
effect. The central theme was reducing the
poverty of the majority of South Africans,
and thereby redressing the inequalities and
injustices of colonialism and apartheid.
Access to water, jobs, land, education,
and health care, were among the priorities
highlighted. Apart from a massive invest-
ment in infrastructure, however, the docu-
ment gave little indication what the new
economic strategy would entail. Following
the April elections, an RDP Office was
established within the Office of the Presi-
dent, charged with the responsibility of
co-ordinating RDP-related activities,
including the spending of the initially
modest RDP budget. In November 1994,
the ANC-led government introduced the
RDP White Paper, the content of which was
not dissimilar to that of the earlier policy
framework document, but arguably with a
more ‘business friendly’ and fiscally con-
servative bent (Bond 2000). In early 1996,
after much public debate as to the implica-
tions of the RDP for economic policy, the
RDP Office was closed and its staff dis-
persed to various government departments.
The closure of the RDP office appeared
to have been of a piece with the introduc-
tion by the Department of Finance in that
year of the framework for Growth, Em-
ployment and Redistribution (GEAR).
GEAR was a conventional neo-classical
macroeconomic recipe for economic
growth. While not intrinsically incompat-
ible with the goals of either the RDP or the
nascent National Growth and Development
Strategy that complemented the RDP,
GEAR eclipsed the latter as the central
economic programme of the government.
Business leaders applauded GEAR for its
emphasis on fiscal restraint, the expressed
commitment to controlling inflation and
interest rates, as well as the promise of
loosened foreign exchange controls.
Among the more controversial aspects of
GEAR were the recommendations that the
public service be downsized and state-
owned enterprises be ‘restructured’, that is,
sold off to the private sector. Not surpris-
ingly, the adoption by government of
GEAR as the blueprint for South Africa’s
economic policy also outraged many
observers and strained the tripartite alli-
ance between the ANC, the South African
Communist Party (SACP), and the Con-
gress of South African Trade Unions
(Cosatu). Critics considered GEAR to be a
neo-liberal sell-out by the ANC (for exam-
ple, Bond 2000), as well as an inappropri-
ate approach to solving the country’s most
pressing economic problems, such as
unemployment and poverty (Adelzadeh et
al. 1998). The RDP may have continued in
name as an assortment of government
activities broadly consistent with the aim
of reducing poverty and hardship, but
inside and outside of government, a com-
mon charge was that the RDP was dead.
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Whatever the process of formulating
GEAR may have lacked in transparency,
the document that introduced it to the
world made up for that, containing as it did
the results of the macro-model simulations
running from 1996 through 2000. In the
event, the only stated target that has been
achieved is that of reducing the fiscal
deficit. In terms of real GDP growth, the
projected annual average was 4.2 per cent,
compared to the actual average of around
2.3 per cent (Department of Finance 2000;
SARB 2000). In terms of formal sector
employment growth, the projected
cumulative increase over the 5 years
was 1.3 million jobs, versus an actual job
loss of more than 800 000. Much in the
modelling – and arguably in the whole
strategy – hinged on the assumption that
foreign direct investment would pick up
substantially. Foreign direct investment is
particularly important in view of the low
level of domestic savings. The modelling
assumption that specifically informed the
optimistic ‘integrated scenario projections’
of the GEAR document was that foreign
direct investment would increase from the
base scenario of no change by an annual
average of US$509 million. However, in
reality what has happened is that the
easing of exchange restrictions has facili-
tated outward direct investment of South
African companies wishing to diversify
overseas. Contrary to the GEAR assump-
tion, the net effect has been negative (that
is, outward direct investment has exceeded
foreign direct investment into South Africa)
for every year since 1994 (SARB 2000).
Of course, whether these unfortunate
developments are the result of GEAR, or
of the failure to implement GEAR fully, or
whether the situation would have been
worse in the absence of GEAR, is a complex
debate which we will not enter into here.
By and large, the economy since 1994
has performed poorly relative to expecta-
tions, and the most glaring consequence
has been the worsening of the already
serious unemployment problem, even in
the presence of modest growth. This
scenario of ‘jobless growth’ became
especially poignant in 2000, when growth
reached a four-year high while formal
sector job losses accelerated.
There has, however, been some cause
for celebration when it comes to the deliv-
ery of services. While delivery of services
has also been slow relative to expectations,
it has nonetheless made a palpable change
in many people’s lives. Since 1994, the
various government programmes and
municipal infrastructure programmes have
improved access to safe water for 4 million
people, improved sanitation services for
over 3 million people, built 600 new
clinics, 700 000 houses, had 1.5 million
more households connected to the electri-
cal grid, and so on. A study by the Com-
munity Agency for Social Enquiry (CASE)
on behalf of the South African Human
Rights Commission’s Second economic
and social rights report (2000) found that
a substantial fraction of those surveyed
reported some sort of development of
infrastructure or services within the
previous year.
Population profile and poverty
statistics
Before proceeding to discuss the literature
on chronic poverty, it may be useful for
sake of reference to briefly record some
basic statistics regarding the South African
population and the incidence of poverty:
The 1996 census undertaken by the
government’s agency Statistics South
Africa established that there were 40.6
million South Africans living in the
country, of whom 31.2 million were
African, 3.7 million were coloured, 1.2
million were Indian, and
4.5 million were white. Of the 9 million
households in the country, 6.5 million
were African, and 5.4 million were
urban. Among African households,
51 per cent were rural (Stats SA 2000a;
Stats SA 2000b).
The total fertility rate at the time of the
census was around 3.0 to 3.2. The
infant mortality rate was 0.051, and life
expectancy at birth was 64.5 years
(Stats SA 2000a). The infant mortality
rate is 8 to 10 times higher for blacks
than for whites.
2. Historical background and present economic context
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Based on a per adult equivalent poverty
line of R352 per month, 71.6 per cent
of all poor people reside in rural areas,
and 70.9 per cent of all rural people
are poor. With reference to the same
poverty line, 61 per cent of Africans
are poor, compared to 38 per cent of
coloureds, 5 per cent of Indians, and
1 per cent of whites (May et al. 2000).
Among households in the poorest
quintile in 1995, 51 per cent of all
expenditure was on food (Budlender
1999).
Around 23 per cent of children under
6 years are stunted, indicating chronic
under-nutrition. The most seriously
affected children are those in rural areas
whose mothers have relatively little
education (Steyn 2000).
Income inequalities are extreme, with
an individual-based (as opposed to
household-based) Gini coefficient of
0.73 (Stats SA 2000b).
Access to services is highly skewed by
income level, by location, and by race.
For example, 18 per cent of households
within the poorest decile must travel
more than 1km to access water, versus
1 per cent of households in the top
three deciles (Budlender 1999).
The adult illiteracy rate is 15 per cent
(UNDP 2000).
In terms of the United Nations Develop-
ment Programme’s Human Develop-
ment Index published for 1998, South
Africa ranks 103 out of 174 countries,
just below Tunisia and Moldova, and
just above El Salvadore and Cape Verde
(UNDP 2000).
Summary
South Africa’s present-day configuration
of poverty and inequality bears overriding
racial and gender dimensions resulting
from the country’s history. Land disposses-
sion, followed by race-based ‘separate
development’ polices together with influx
controls, have left a legacy of maldistribu-
tion of wealth and marketable skills,
spatially divided households, and inferior
living conditions for the poor majority.
With the first all-race democratic elec-
tions in 1994, the ANC-led government
inherited a more or less functioning social
security system, but little in the way of
programmes designed to directly assist
poor people out of poverty. The principal
strategy of the new government for pov-
erty alleviation appears to have been to
promote economic growth, which in turn
would expand employment opportunities
and raise incomes. However, real growth
in the economy since 1994 has been
modest, and has failed to reverse the trend
of formal sector job losses that has been
evident since the early 1990s. Meanwhile,
the redistribution of productive assets has
been very limited. The most tangible anti-
poverty impact attributable to the post-
apartheid government is the improved
access to services and infrastructure in
many areas, both urban and rural.
Notes
1 In 1994 the Transvaal province was
divided into Northern Province,
Mpumalanga, Gauteng and a part of
North-West.
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A key aspect of the chapter is toseek to identify and enumeratespecific categories of the
chronically poor – for example the disabled,
those living in deep rural poverty, AIDS
orphans, and so on. In doing so, the
section elaborates upon the factors that
have contributed to these people’s chronic
poverty, including factors relating to their
personal characteristics, as well as those
relating to the economic environment and
resource distribution.
The section is organised as follows.
First, it summarises direct quantitative evi-
dence on the incidence of chronic poverty
in South Africa. Much of this emanates
from the one South African panel data set
that has thus far been collected, namely the
KwaZulu-Natal Income Dynamics Study.
Given the critical link between employ-
ment and poverty, employment patterns
and trends are discussed in their own right.
Some of this discussion also relates to the
KwaZulu-Natal data, but some does not. It
then moves on to survey the South African
literature on the qualitative and subjective
aspects of the experience of poverty, and
tries to relate this (not always successfully)
to the specific theme of chronic poverty.
Finally, the chapter surveys different
categories of chronically poor people, or
people at risk of falling into chronic pov-
erty, and ventures some estimates as to
how many households and individuals are
included in these categories and in total.
Recent quantitative research on
chronic poverty in South Africa
We examine two varieties of quantitative
evidence on chronic poverty, the one
dealing broadly with income dynamics as
revealed by panel data, and the other
focusing more particularly on employment
dynamics and the changing pattern of
employment over time. Obviously the two
are closely related to one another; moreo-
ver, some of the notable research into
employment dynamics relies on the same
panel data set from KwaZulu-Natal as the
research into income dynamics. The
distinction is made for sake of convenience
of presentation.
The distinction between quantitative
and qualitative treatments of chronic
poverty is of course not always rigidly
observed (though often it is). We mention
in this respect what is probably the first
panel study of poverty in South Africa,
namely that of Ardington (1988; 1995),
who studied the 70 KwaZulu households
in 1982 and again in 1985 and 1993.
While Ardington does not use her panel
explicitly to gauge the extent of chronic
2. Historical background and present economic context
3. South Africa’s chronically
poor: a quantitative and
qualitative picture
Introduction
This chapter seeks to provide an up-to-date, critical survey of what is
known about the incidence of chronic poverty in South Africa.
However, because of the paucity of direct information about the
incidence of chronic poverty, much of what we know is deduced from
work pertaining to poverty generally.
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poverty, she paints a vivid picture of the
factors that often combine to keep house-
holds poor, in part by gauging the change
in household incomes over the intervening
period, and in part by relating the case
histories of the households in her sample.
What emerges is a portrait of extremely
vulnerable households that fail to emerge
from poverty due to harsh environmental
conditions, a fickle labour market, and
changing household composition.
The KwaZulu-Natal Income Dynamics Study
(KIDS)
In 1998 a research consortium consisting
of the University of Natal, the University
of Wisconsin, and the International Food
Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), under-
took a re-survey of some 1 200 KwaZulu-
Natal households that had five years earlier
been interviewed as part of the 1993
Southern Africa Labour and Development
Research Unit (Saldru) survey.1 This re-
survey comprises the KwaZulu-Natal
Income Dynamics Study (KIDS), which,
as the name suggests, aims to provide an
empirical basis for understanding how
households’ fortunes change over time.
Since this is the only large-scale panel
study of income dynamics in South Africa
to date, it is discussed at some length.
Thus far, the findings from KIDS have
been summarised in three reports, by May
et al. (1999), Roberts (2000), and Carter
and May (1999a). Roberts presents a
succinct overview of the data collection
process for KIDS, as well as of basic
findings. Of note is the fact that only
African households from the original
Saldru sample were re-visited, but 15 per
cent of these were not possible to track
down, while 41 additional ‘split-off’
household units were incorporated.2 A
household is defined as ‘poor’ in a particu-
lar year, if its monthly per adult equivalent
expenditure in that year is less than R237
(in constant 1993 rand).3
Based on the roughly 1 200 households
included in the panel, the incidence of
poverty in the two years is presented in
Table 1.
Table 1 shows that 22 per cent of the
sampled households qualified as poor in
both periods, and thus can be categorised
as chronically poor.
As Roberts points out, the proportion
of households ascribed to these different
categories is rather sensitive to definitions,
for instance of the poverty line, of adult
equivalents, and even when one accepts
that a household has made the transition
from one state to the other. For instance,
McCulloch and Baulch (1999) propose a
different definition of chronically poor,
whereby a household’s average adult
equivalent expenditure between the two
years must itself be below the poverty
threshold, and where the difference be-
tween the adult equivalent expenditure
figures for the two periods must be greater
than 10 per cent for it to be judged to have
truly crossed the threshold. According to
this definition, some 33 per cent of the
households are chronically poor (Roberts
2000).
In addition, Roberts presents a ‘transi-
tion matrix’ (Table 2) showing households’
inter-period mobility between four differ-
ent expenditure ranges, from the ‘ultra-
poor’ on up. A household is defined as
ultra-poor if its monthly adult equivalent
expenditure is less than half the poverty
line as defined above.
The diagonal elements, marked in bold,
represent those households that were in the
Table 1: Proportion of sample that were ultra-poor and poor in 1993 and 1998
Expenditure classes, 1998
Expenditure classes, 1993 below poverty line above poverty line
below poverty line chronically poor – 22.3% transitorily poor – 11.4%
above poverty line transitorily poor – 19.3% never poor – 47.0%
Adapted from Roberts 2000:16.
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same category in 1998 as in 1993.4 For
example, 48.6 per cent of those house-
holds that were classified as poor but not
ultra poor in 1993, were still such in 1998.
More interestingly, of those that were
classified as ultra-poor in 1993, only 17.7
per cent remained such in 1998. While the
majority of the rest moved up only one
expenditure class, and thus remain poor
and so qualify as chronically poor, one
wonders whether their upward movement
from 1993 to 1998 may in fact be part of a
trajectory that extended beyond 1998. In
other words, are they chronically poor, or
just slow to make the transition to non-poor?
Table 2 also reveals the relationship
between ultra-poverty and chronic poverty.
One might suppose that the ultra-poor and
the chronically poor are more or less the
same people, because the poorer one is,
surely the more difficult it is to escape
poverty. Indeed, it is true that of those who
were ultra-poor in 1993, 67 per cent were
still poor in 1998, and thus are designated
as chronically poor. However, from a
slightly different perspective, there is
evidence to contradict this supposition.
Note that a household that was ultra-poor
in 1993 evidently had a 32 per cent chance
of finding itself above the poverty line in
1998, whereas for a household that in
1993 was poor but not ultra-poor, the
probability was 35 per cent. This is not a
striking difference, and suggests that the
ultra-poor have about as much chance of
remaining in or escaping from poverty as
the less poor. Moreover, with a little ma-
nipulation, one can determine that of the
total number of households that are desig-
nated as chronically poor by virtue of
being below the poverty expenditure line
in both periods, only around 20 per cent
were ultra-poor in either period.
Roberts proceeds to compare the differ-
ent categories of households (chronically
poor, transitorily poor, and never poor), in
terms of rural versus urban residence,
demographic characteristics, as well as a
‘suite’ of other household characteristics.
Among the various findings that distin-
guish the chronically poor are the
following:
86.9 per cent of all chronically poor
households in KwaZulu-Natal are from
rural areas, while 30 per cent of rural
African households are chronically
poor
chronically poor households tend to
have more members, are more likely to
be female-headed, and on average have
older household heads
adult members of chronically poor
households are less educated and have
a lower level of literacy than their
counterparts from other categories of
households (though between 1993 and
1998 enormous strides were evidently
made even within the category of the
chronically poor)
chronically poor households have
access to less arable land per capita
chronically poor households spend
considerably less money on food per
adult equivalent than other households
from the other categories
chronically poor households are more
likely to receive pensions.
Table 2: Transition matrix for KIDS data
Expenditure Expenditure classes, 1998 Row sum
0 to ½ x PL  ½ x PL to PL  PL to 2 x PL  > 2 x PL
0 to ½ x PL  17.7%  50.0%  25.8%  6.5%  100.0
½ x PL to PL  17.2%  48.6%  25.4%  8.8%  100.0
PL to 2 x PL  8.0%  32.4%  36.8%  22.8%  100.0
> 2 x PL  1.8%  11.9%  27.5%  58.7%  100.0
Source: Roberts 2000:15.
classes 1993
3. South Africa’s chronically poor: A quantitative and qualitative picture
14
Study of the incidence and nature of chronic poverty and
 development policy in South Africa: An overview
It is not possible to say to what extent
the results of the KIDS panel can be
generalised to the rest of the country.
KwaZulu-Natal has about 18 per cent of all
African households in the country, and
ranks among the poorer provinces in terms
of the prevalence as revealed by head-
count measures. Most likely, the patterns
described above obtain elsewhere, though
the percentages would probably differ.
Carter and May (1999a) delve more
deeply into the KIDS data to examine the
nature of different categories of poverty.
They do this in two distinct ways. First,
they build on their earlier work involving
the development of a ‘class typology’
(Carter & May, 1999b), which classifies
people according to their ‘entitlement
bases’, and the extent to which these may
or may not serve to help them rise out of
poverty. They determine that those classes
that are most likely to be characterised by
chronic poverty are ‘marginalised house-
holds’, whose primary asset is unskilled
labour; ‘remittance-dependant house-
holds’, who rely on cash transfers from
non-resident family members; and thirdly,
those households which depend upon the
secondary labour market, meaning for
example casual workers and those in-
volved in less remunerative informal self-
employment.
The other interesting tack pursued by
the paper is to try to understand how
‘entitlement shocks’ (for example, loss of
productive assets) and ‘entitlement losses’
(for example, severance of relationships
upon which one relies for assistance) affect
households, and how this can help us
understand the composition of the various
categories of poor households. They
produce a more nuanced view of the
chronically poor, as well as of the
transitorily poor and non-poor.
Notwithstanding the fact that the so-
phisticated statistical methodology is
difficult to grasp, the findings are quite
intuitive. The chronically poor are not a
homogeneous group, but rather can be
divided into two distinct types: there
are those households that are truly in a
‘poverty trap’, and those households that
happened to be poor in both 1993 and
1998 due to adverse shocks in the survey
years or just before. In a sense, then, their
use of the term ‘poverty trap’ is akin to
what we have generally meant by ‘chronic
poverty’. By their reckoning, the true
proportion of African households in
KwaZulu-Natal that are chronically poor
(in our less precise sense) is not 22 per
cent, but rather 19 per cent. Thus, while
the distinction may be interesting, the
difference it makes to our order-of-magni-
tude estimates of the number of people
stuck in poverty trap is fairly slight.
The dynamics of unemployment and
employment in relation to poverty
states
The importance of employment to
household income and welfare is well-
Table 3: Decomposing categories of the inter-period income
1998
1993 poor non-poor
 poor chronically poor – 22.3%, of whom: got ahead – 11.4%, of whom:
· 14% in dual entitlement failures · 46% stochastically poor in 1993
· 86% in poverty trap · 54% structurally poor in 1993
non-poor fell behind – 19.3%, of whom: never poor – 47.0%, of whom:
· 30% chronic poor, but fortunate · 19% dual positive shocks and
in 1993  vulnerable
· 45% stochastically poor in 1998  · 81% structurally non-poor
· 9% new structurally poor
Source: Carter and May 1999a:29.
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established (for example, Cichello et al.
2000), and thus merits specific focus in
any overview treatment of chronic poverty.
After presenting an overview of the em-
ployment situation in South Africa, we
extract three themes from the sizeable
South African literature: first, the dynamics
of employment, as revealed in the KIDS
data set; second, the changing nature of
employment in the formal sector; and
third, the nature of employment in the
informal sector.
A picture of unemployment and
employment in South Africa
Unemployment is high and rising in South
Africa. Between 1994 and 1998, the
aggregate unemployment rate has risen
from 20 per cent to 26 per cent, according
to the ‘narrow definition’ used by Statistics
South Africa, whereby a person is unem-
ployed if he or she has actively sought
work in the past four weeks. According to
the ‘broad definition’ of unemployment,
whereby one wishes to be employed but
has not necessarily sought work in recent
weeks, the change between 1994 and 1998
was from 31 per cent to 39 per cent. As
Kingdon and Knight (2000a) point out, the
gap between the narrow and broad defini-
tion figures suggests that a large fraction of
the work force is ‘discouraged’, that is,
these people have ceased actively search-
ing for employment out of frustration, or
for lack of resources, or both.
Table 4 shows that the incidence of
unemployment is considerably greater for
Africans and coloureds than for whites.
It also disaggregates employment by
‘sector’, by which we mean here informal
and formal, and employment versus self-
employment. Overall, Africans and
coloureds are more likely to be employed
or self-employed in the informal sector,
and in absolute terms whites comprise a
relatively tiny share of activity in the
informal sector.
Not surprisingly, the incidence of
unemployment is strongly differentiated
according to race, gender, place of resi-
dence, and so forth. In 1999, the incidence
employment and unemployment is as
presented in Tables 5 and 6 on the next
page, where unemployment is understood
according to the broad definition5:
Unemployment is clearly more severe
among women than among men, and,
among Africans, is considerably more
severe in rural areas than in urban areas.
The fact that unemployment among Afri-
cans is higher in rural than in urban areas,
is something of an international anomaly,
and probably in large measure is due to
insufficient access of Africans to agricul-
tural land. Part-time and casual employ-
ment make up a relatively small proportion
of employment, though it must be noted
that the survey picks up those who have
been casually employed within the previous
Table 4: Incidence of employment and unemployment, by race and sector, 1999 (includ-
ing domestic workers)
African and coloured White
millions per cent millions per cent
unemployed 6.7 45.5% 0.2 8.5%
employee, formal sector 5.4 36.9% 1.5 69.4%
employee, informal sector* 1.4 9.6% 0.1 2.4%
self-employed, formal sector 0.1 1.0% 0.3 14.3%
self-employed, informal sector 1.0 7.0% 0.1 5.4%
total 14.7 100.0% 2.2 100.0%
Source: calculated from October Household Survey 1999 (Stats SA 2000c).
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week, as opposed to those who may have
had casual work within, say, the year.
In addition to the static picture pre-
sented above, we note the following salient
facts (following Kingdon and Knight
2000b), based again upon data from the
1999 October Household Survey:
Seventy percent of those who are
presently unemployed have never had a
job. The figure for women is 73 per
cent; for Africans 73 per cent; for rural
dwellers 76 per cent; and for rural
African women 79 per cent.
Around 69 per cent of those who are
presently unemployed have been
unemployed for more than one year,
while 41 per cent have been unem-
ployed for more than three years;
among the African unemployed, the
figures are 72 per cent and 44 per cent,
respectively.
Quality of life is considerably worse for
those who are employed or self-em-
ployed in the informal sector than for
those in the formal sector, and still
worse for the unemployed; for example,
of African and coloured households
whose head is employed (or self-
employed) in the formal sector and
having children younger than 7 years,
16 per cent reported insufficient money
to feed those children at some point in
the previous year, whereas for those
in the informal sector, the figure was
27 per cent, and for those whose house-
hold head is unemployed, the figure
was 40 per cent.6
In light of these figures, it is reasonable to
suppose that the protracted nature of
unemployment is a major factor in main-
taining chronic poverty. This supposition
is explored systematically below.
Panel studies of employment
Thus far, there have been at least two
labour-oriented studies based upon the
same KIDS data set described in the
previous section. These offer additional
insights into the dynamics of livelihoods
Table 5: Incidence of employment and unemployment, by race and gender, 1999
African Coloured White
women men women men women men
full-time 18.8% 32.0% 32.9% 50.5% 42.0% 62.1%
part-time 3.4% 4.2% 3.3% 3.3% 5.2% 3.0%
casual 2.5% 3.2% 6.1% 5.6% 1.3% 1.1%
unemployed 75.3% 60.5% 57.8% 40.5% 51.6% 33.7%
Source: calculated from October Household Survey 1999 (Stats SA 2000c).
Table 6: Incidence of employment and unemployment, by race and location, 1999
African Coloured White
urban rural urban rural urban rural
full-time 45.6% 37.5% 57.3% 71.1% 82.8% 84.1%
part-time 6.9% 5.7% 5.0% 3.8% 6.7% 5.5%
casual 4.2% 5.5% 8.6% 8.1% 1.9% 3.0%
unemployed 43.3% 51.4% 29.1% 17.0% 8.6% 7.4%
Source: calculated from October Household Survey 1999 (Stats SA 2000c).
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over time. We briefly review each of them
in turn.
First, Keswell (2000) attempts to relate
the incidence of transitions between differ-
ent employment states and types to demo-
graphic factors and personal characteristics.
In Table 7, the 1993–98 transition frequen-
cies are shown, after the same manner of
the expenditure class transition frequencies
reported above.
What is revealed is that, among those
out of the labour force or unemployed in
1993, transition into self-employment is
less likely than remaining in one’s present
state. A person who was unemployed in
1993, however, had a 35 per cent chance
of gaining employment, which is not
insignificant – but neither, in the light
of the five-year time lapse, is it very
encouraging. Interestingly, the probability
of an unemployed person entering self-
employment – meaning informal sector
self-employment – is much smaller, only
5.1 per cent. This raises the question about
the extent to which unemployment is truly
involuntary, in the sense that unemployed
people seem either unable or unwilling to
engage in self-employment when efforts to
find (formal sector) employment fail.
However, as can also be seen in Table 7,
the status of self-employment is somewhat
precarious: half of those who in 1993 were
engaged in self-employment, ended up
either unemployed or out of the labour
force by 1998.7 We return to the issue of
self-employment below.
Keswell relates the incidence of these
transitions to individuals’ age, education,
place of residence, and so on.8 He infers,
inter alia, that women are especially liable
to go from employment to unemployment;
that membership in a savings club (for
example, a stokvel) decreases one’s prob-
ability of going from employment to
unemployment; that being older and being
female both heighten the chances of one’s
leaving the labour force through self-
employment; and that education is critical
in boosting the chances of those not in the
labour force to obtain employment, but is
not so important for those that are in
employment. Some of the statistics relating
to the transition from self-employment
seem to suggest that many self-employed
persons are women whose ability to remain
self-employed is liable to be interrupted by
other obligations.
Cichello et al. (2000) also make use of
the KIDS data, but draw a somewhat
different (which is not to say inconsistent)
set of conclusions to that of Keswell. What
is particularly useful in their approach is
that they seek to make an explicit link
between employment states and household
income, by determining the ‘earnings line’
that corresponds to the same poverty data
used by Roberts (2000) and by Carter and
May (1999b). Table 8 on the next page
indicates the probability of making various
transitions, as a function of employment
changes between 1993 and 1998.
The two off-diagonal values have
particular interpretations. The probability
of being a household which was above the
earnings line in 1993 but below it in 1998
is 9 per cent; this is called the ‘risk rate’,
Table 7: Transition matrix of employment states, based on KIDS data
1993 1998 Row sum
out of labour unemployed self-employed employed
force
out of labour force 46.9% 31.7% 2.7% 18.6% 100.0%
unemployed 7.7% 52.1% 5.1% 35.0% 100.0%
self-employed 30.8% 19.5% 21.9% 27.8% 100.0%
employed 10.3% 16.7% 2.8% 70.2% 100.0%
Adapted from Keswell 2000:14.
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and refers to the likelihood of falling into
poverty by virtue of a change in employ-
ment status. The figure may seem low, but
is in fact high relative to the total number
of households that were above the earn-
ings line in 1993, as shown by the row
percentage of 36 per cent in brackets. On
the other hand, the probability of being
below the earnings line in 1993, but above
it in 1998, is referred to as the ‘escape
rate’, and is 15 per cent, or 20 per cent
amongst all those that started out below
the earning line in 1993.
In addition to demonstrating that earn-
ings are extremely volatile and account for
a high degree of mobility between states of
poverty and non-poverty, Cichello et al.
attempt to identify factors that contribute to
‘risk’ and ‘escape’, and conclude that:
ceteris paribus, males and urban
residents are more likely to move out
of poverty and less likely to fall into
poverty, heads of household are
more likely to move out of poverty,
and unionised workers and KwaZulu
residents [as opposed to Natal
residents] are less likely to fall into
poverty (2000:20).
In addition, the authors reject the ‘cumula-
tive advantage hypothesis’, whereby the
fortunate become more so, while the less
fortunate remain so. Rather, the job market
has the tendency to equalise the fortunate
and the unfortunate over time, which may
be merely another way of saying that,
given the volatile nature of earnings, there
tends to be regression towards the mean.
The changing nature of employment in
the formal sector
The overall pattern of formal sector em-
ployment in South Africa over the past
several years is that fewer people have
employment, but those that do have en-
joyed real increases in remuneration.
However, there is also a broadening grey
area involving increased employment
through the so-called secondary labour
market, whereby tasks that had previously
been performed by permanent, regular
workers, are increasingly being performed
by temporary, casual, and part-time work-
ers, or what are sometimes euphemistically
called ‘independent contractors’. The
evidence of this trend mainly comes to us
through industry-specific micro-studies.
For example, the pattern of ‘flexibilisation’
has been documented for retailing (Valodia
1991; Kenny & Webster 1999; Clarke
2000), clothing (Altman 1995; Kesper
1999; Netshitomboni 1998), electronics
(Ray 1998), and agriculture (Simbi &
Aliber 2000). Valodia (2000) notes three
important characteristics of the growth of
the secondary labour market: first, the
reliance upon labour brokers and sub-
contractual relationships; second, the
increase in home-based work (especially
in the clothing industry); and third, the
increasing prevalence of women in such
work. Broadly speaking, flexibilisation
most strongly affects unskilled and semi-
skilled types of work. Thus, at the margin,
many low-income earners who are able to
remain employed, find themselves more
vulnerable.
While this trend is not dissimilar to that
which prevails elsewhere in the developed
and developing world, it comes at a time in
South Africa when there are diminishing
employment opportunities, and within an
environment where governmental and non-
governmental institutions set up to protect
workers’ rights are weak. In some sectors,
Table 8: Transitions between earnings thresholds, 1993 and 1998, based on KIDS data
1993 1998
below above
below 59.9% (80%) 14.9% (20%)
above 9.0% (36%) 16.3% (64%)
Adapted from Cichello et al. 2000:7.
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for instance textiles, the pressure on indus-
try to cut direct wage and overhead costs is
extreme due to the rapid lowering of tariff
barriers. However, in other instances the
move to flexibilisation is driven by em-
ployers’ disinclination to honour new
comprehensive labour legislation, whether
these impose actual costs or reduce em-
ployers’ manoeuvrability (Clarke 2000). In
the commercial agricultural sector, how-
ever, Simbi and Aliber (2000) show that
many farmers feel compelled to casualise
their work force as a means of reducing
the perceived danger of various types of
land claims, and moreover are willing to
incur the cost of mechanising in order to
do so. The decline and flexibilisation of
employment in this sector is especially
damaging for rural livelihoods, because
commercial agriculture represented almost
one third of formal sector employment in
rural areas in 1998, and yet the total
amount of regular employment on farms
has declined by about 20 per cent over the
past decade.
There are no clear, comprehensive
measures of the extent of the secondary
labour market. Table 9 tries to give some
idea of the relative incidence of non-
permanent work at one point in time.
Ostensibly, three quarters of all employ-
ment among Africans and coloureds is
permanent, while the balance is of a more
temporary or insecure nature. A cause for
concern is that a large fraction of those
who describe their positions as permanent,
either have no written contract, or do not
know whether they have such a contract.
This suggests that up to 45 per cent of
African and coloured workers who deem
their work to be permanent may be more
insecure than they realise.
Among African and coloured women
employees describing their work as
permanent, only 48 per cent have written
contracts.
Finally, one other measure of the
‘secondariness’ of one’s employment is the
extent to which one receives non-wage
remuneration such as pension and medical
aid contributions. Table 11 overleaf shows
that, among African and coloured employ-
ees, fewer than half receive a pension con-
tribution from their employer, and around
Table 9: Forms of employment, 1999
African Coloured White
permanent 75.1% 75.9% 89.1%
fixed contract 2.4% 3.7% 2.5%
temporary 12.1% 5.3% 4.6%
casual 7.3% 10.4% 3.3%
seasonal 1.3% 3.6% 0.04%
don’t know 1.9% 1.1% 0.5%
Source: calculated from October Household Survey 1999 (Stats SA 2000c).
Table 10: Frequency of written contracts among ‘permanent’ employees, 1999
African Coloured White
written contract 55.5% 52.7% 76.7%
no written contract 37.5% 39.5% 19.3%
don’t know 7.0% 7.8% 4.0%
Source: calculated from October Household Survey 1999 (Stats SA 2000c).
3. South Africa’s chronically poor: A quantitative and qualitative picture
20
Study of the incidence and nature of chronic poverty and
 development policy in South Africa: An overview
one quarter to one third receive contribu-
tions towards medical aid.
The picture that emerges is that an
undefined but significant proportion of
people employed in the formal sector
occupy a marginal status that affords them
neither security nor significant non-cash
benefits.
Employment and self-employment in
the informal sector
Stats SA’s reported employment trends,
based on consecutive October Household
Surveys from 1996 and 1998, purported to
show that employment levels had stabi-
lised, mainly because formal sector job
losses were roughly offset by increases in
informal sector employment and self-
employment. While we cannot arrive at
certainty, as these consecutive surveys do
not comprise a panel, it seems likely that
many of those entering self-employment in
1998 were those who lost formal sector
employment in 1996 and 1997, a process
which Cosatu calls – not without reason –
‘disguised unemployment’ (Cosatu 2000).
However, while informal sector
employment is inferior to formal sector
employment, from both an individual and
societal point of view it is preferable to
unemployment. Kingdon and Knight
(2000b) marvel at the fact that the share of
informal sector employment in South
Africa’s economically active population is
so low, despite such high levels of unem-
ployment. Drawing again on Table 4, we
see that among Africans and coloureds in
1999, there were 6.7 million unemployed
people as opposed to 2.4 million employed
in the informal sector, one third of whom
were domestic workers. By contrast, 90
per cent of India’s workforce are employed
in the informal sector. Indeed, Keswell’s
transition matrix (Table 7) reveals that, at
least for the KwaZulu-Natal sample, a
person who was unemployed in 1993 was
ten times more likely to still be unem-
ployed in 1998 than self-employed.9
Kingdon and Knight therefore ask the
question why the unemployed do not
enter informal sector employment and
self-employment in larger numbers, and
conclude that, in so far as the unemployed
are much worse off than the informally
employed across a range of indicators,
there must be barriers to entry. Among
these barriers to entry are possibly lack of
capital, lack of entrepreneurial skills, and
inability to penetrate informal community
networks that may control opportunities,
for example, by controlling access to street
space or taxi routes.
Informal sector self-employment can
also be quite risky. In a survey of different
types of SMMEs operating in Winterveldt
and Gazankulu, Aliber (2001) found that
most SMMEs encounter serious risks on a
daily basis. Taxi owners risk being killed
by rival taxi owners, public telephone huts
and hair salons risk theft of equipment,
automobile mechanics risk theft of clients’
cars, tavern owners risk having patrons
stabbing and shooting one another; and
since SMMEs operate almost entirely on a
cash basis, they all face a constant risk of
robbery. Moreover, it would appear that
the more lucrative enterprises require the
Table 11: Pension and medical contributions to employees
African Coloured White
pension medical pension medical pension medical
employer 44.1% 23.2% 43.3% 29.5% 69.1% 65.2%
contributes
does not 49.0% 72.9% 50.2% 66.8% 27.0% 32.9%
contribute
don’t know 6.8% 3.9% 6.5% 3.7% 3.9% 1.9%
Source: calculated from October Household Survey 1999 (Stats SA 2000c).
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most start-up capital, and face the most
serious risks, which, in the absence of
widely available micro-finance and micro-
insurance, puts them beyond the reach of
the average unemployed person. To these
factors we might add lack of a market.
Opportunities for starting remunerative
SMMEs may be most limited in rural areas,
and, as Ardington (1988) shows, income-
earning opportunities from self-employ-
ment tend to diminish when formal sector
(‘core economy’) employment falls, since
lower remittances to rural areas means less
disposable income fuelling the informal
economy there.
Quality of life and experiential
aspects of chronic poverty
One of the shortcomings of the panel study
approach to the study of poverty dynamics
is the focus on money-metric measures of
poverty. Even where the incidence of
chronic poverty is explicitly related to
qualitative aspects of people’s lives or
environments, as illustrated in Carter and
May’s paper, the focus is nonetheless on
explaining or interpreting the bottom-line
measure, for example, expenditure per
adult equivalent, which is typically not the
only important dimension to people’s
experience of poverty. Indeed, over the
course of the past two decades, increasing
attention has been given to the fact that
poor people’s experience of poverty
involves a great deal more than inadequate
income or consumption (Chambers 1994;
Kanbur & Squire 1999). This has been
forcefully illustrated in South Africa by
means of a number of qualitative research
initiatives, of which perhaps the most
ambitious is the excellent South African
Participatory Poverty Assessment, or ‘SA-
PPA’ (1998).10
If in the context of quantitative
analyses chronic poverty is understood
as the persistence of income-poverty or
expenditure-poverty over time, then in the
experiential approach, we presumably
understand chronic poverty to be the
persistence over time of the subjective
state of poverty. However, there are at least
two other ways in which chronic poverty
can be illuminated by qualitative and
particularly participatory studies. Firstly,
these studies can assist us to understand
whether and how people experience the
idea of poverty traps, and how they con-
ceptualise the barriers to escaping them.11
Secondly, studies such as these can enrich
our understanding of the causes of chronic
poverty, including the conventional meas-
ures of income-poverty. These latter two
dimensions are of course characteristic of
the philosophy of participatory appraisal
methodologies, wherein the ‘subjects’ of
the study are esteemed for their analytical
input as well as or more than as providers
of data (Chambers 1994).
The strategy of this subsection is sim-
ple. Using SA-PPA and other qualitative
and participatory studies, we describe key
facts of life that appear to figure promi-
nently in South Africans’ perceptions of
poverty, and then seek to embellish these
where appropriate with information from
other sources. In doing so, we attempt to
understand whether this ‘fact of life’ may
be of a ‘chronic’ (enduring) nature, and/or
how this factor contributes to other dimen-
sions of chronic poverty.
Vulnerability and resignation
Poor people are vulnerable to a number of
harmful and potentially devastating threats,
which they may not have the resources or
power to avert. Among such threats are fire
(for example, shack fires, which destroy
homes and possessions); floods (because
poorer people often end up erecting their
shelters in flood-prone areas); job loss;
crime (theft of money and possessions,
and bodily harm); poor agricultural condi-
tions (for example, for those who rely in
part on food production for sustenance);
and illness and death in the family (often
with no resources to seek medical care).
While on one level this notion of
‘vulnerability’ has its correlate in the
quantitative treatments of poverty dynam-
ics discussed above (for example, ‘risk
rates’, ‘stochastic poverty’, ‘entitlement
shocks’, and so on), on a deeper level the
experience of vulnerability is an aspect of
poverty in and of itself; it constitutes a
palpable disturbance to one’s ‘peace of mind’.
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In the SA-PPA, this sense of vulnerability
was articulated in a number of different
ways. For example, many participants
expressed concern for their ability to cope
with unpredictable crises. Bedford (1995,
cited in May et al. 1997) notes the extreme
stress and anxiety suffered by street chil-
dren, who are exposed to constant threats
of violence and sexual abuse. Chopra and
Ross (1995, cited in May et al. 1997)
indicate that African women in northern
KwaZulu-Natal were particularly aware of
the threat of children falling ill at certain
times of year. Among the homeless, there
is a constant fear of becoming victims of
crime or of police harassment (Van der
Merwe & Aliber 2001).
For many people in South Africa, the
experience of vulnerability is long-term,
since the underlying threats are themselves
long-term, and some (for example, HIV/
AIDS) are clearly becoming worse. As is
well known, the sense of vulnerability has
an effect on people’s ability to escape
poverty. For example, people mitigate
income risk by developing a multiple
livelihood strategy (Ellis 1998); although
this is adaptive and rational, it may inhibit
the individual from concentrating on a
single, potentially more lucrative enter-
prise. On the positive side, some of these
risks can be reduced through government
and non-governmental interventions,
even where income-poverty is not itself
improved.
Closely related to the experience of
vulnerability is the state of being resigned
to always remaining poor. Resignation is
perhaps the most succinct subjective
correlate to the notion of chronic poverty:
it is the assumption that poverty will
endure. Such resignation may be a per-
son’s honest and sober assessment of the
low probability of ever escaping poverty,
but it may also have the practical effect of
discouraging people from taking steps to
increase their chances of living a more
rewarding life, or of escaping their present
state. Where job seekers remain unem-
ployed for year after year, or households
repeatedly lose what little they have been
able to accumulate by dint of family
illness, crime, or natural disasters, pessi-
mism is likely to be the outcome. Partici-
pants in the SA-PPA expressed resignation
in a number of ways, such as by express-
ing the sentiment that life’s difficulties are
endless and must simply be accepted (May
et al. 1997:54).
The migrant labour system, female-
headed households, and gender roles
South Africa’s migrant labour system
developed in distinctive ways owing to a
combination of the singular importance of
employment on mines (a ‘male job’),
influx controls which limited the mobility
of non-employed family members, and
inadequate land resources left to black
people on account of the inequitable land
distribution. We focus here on one particu-
lar consequence of this system, namely a
large number of effectively female-headed
households.
In its ‘ideal’ form, the migrant labour
system means that husbands earn an
income in relatively lucrative jobs outside
of the labour reserves (homelands), which
they remit to their families back home and/
or save. While this may often happen as
planned, it frequently does not. First,
migrant workers may lose their work, and
thus have nothing to remit. Some of these
industries, especially mining, are highly
dangerous, and over the years many
workers have sustained disabling injuries,
succumbed to occupation-related ill-
nesses,12 or been killed. Second, migrant
workers may find other uses of their
earnings, and may send remittances inter-
mittently and insufficiently. From OHS
1999 (Stats SA 2000c), we find that 21 per
cent of all households have one or more
family members who are considered
migrant workers, of whom 19 per cent
send remittances back to the household no
more than once per year.
The SA-PPA relates the experience of
many disillusioned women whose male
partners failed to send remittances accord-
ing to plan (May et al. 1997:37). Bank’s
study of a community in the Eastern Cape
as part of the SA-PPA, revealed the follow-
ing: ‘In Duncan Village, we discovered
that the classic formula for chronic impov-
erishment for female-headed households
23
seemed to be the absence of a reliable
male breadwinner in two consecutive
generations’ (1995:69; cited in May et al.
1997). Many of these women have the
worst of both worlds. On the one hand,
they receive inadequate or unreliable
support, while on the other hand, by virtue
of cultural norms, they often lack rights
(for example, to land), independence (for
example, to make their own economic
decisions), and voice (see below).
The history of absent partners and
fathers has perhaps served to emphasise
and exaggerate the role of women as care-
givers and providers. This is so to such an
extent that, even when men are not absent,
women are often expected to bear financial
responsibility for most things to do with
the household, including paying for food,
paying school fees, and coping with health
emergencies (May et al. 1997:55). Intra-
household financial decisions are in these
instances rife with conflict. Many women
participants in the SA-PPA studies evoked
the image of male partners who ‘pose an
economic and physical threat to women
and children’ (May et al. 1997:18), in part
by dissipating scarce financial resources
on alcohol, drugs, and tobacco. Moreover,
male idleness is juxtaposed against wom-
en’s ‘time poverty’ (May et al. 1997:106).
Such circumstances limit households’
potential for improving their circum-
stances.
There are other dimensions to South
Africa’s migrancy patterns that can have
negative consequences for households.
One of these dimensions is that children
are often left in the care of their grand-
parents, and in particular grandmothers,
on rural homesteads. This reflects the
increased participation of women in the
formal sector, town-based workforce –
hence the need to have someone look after
their children. While this arrangement may
benefit the household as a whole economi-
cally, it may also put undue pressure on
elderly people, whose old age grants end
up being used effectively to support whole
households rather than just themselves.
Ironically, however, the most deprived
areas are those from which out-migration
is relatively subdued. O’Donovan (2000)
suggests that areas that are especially
remote and poor send out relatively few
migrant workers, and thus fail to take
advantage of more lucrative opportunities
elsewhere. Thus while the incidence of
out-migration can in some cases lead to
specific kinds of impoverishment of those
households left behind, the absence of out-
migration can be even worse, because it
means that households lack remittances,
and that the pool of remittances circulating
within the local economy is very limited.
This suggests a particular kind of poverty
trap.
Finally, it is important to note that
migratory patterns do not necessarily
conform to the rural-to-urban (or rural-to-
mine) picture of job-seeking described
above. Cross et al. (1998) show that, at
least for KwaZulu-Natal, a large and
growing share of internal migration in-
volves whole households engaged in rural-
to-rural movements (for example, from
former homeland areas to areas around
rural towns), and is inspired at least as
much by the desire to gain better access to
services and resources (for example,
water) and to flee violence (that is, ‘crisis
moves’), as by the need to look for em-
ployment. Cross et al. point out that one
consequence of this greater mobility is a
disruption of social networks that hitherto
had served as critical safety nets.
Access to infrastructure, services and
amenities
Improved access to infrastructure, services,
and amenities is of course a major chal-
lenge of the post-apartheid government.
The cholera epidemic currently rampaging
through KwaZulu-Natal is a vivid example
of the human costs of the infrastructure
backlog.
A formidable amount of information is
available on the extent of people’s access,
including disaggregations by race and
place of residence (for example, Stats SA
2000a; May et al. 1995); on improvements
since 1994 in this access (Khosa 2000); on
the problems with maintenance that have
been discovered in respect of new infra-
structure, for example, water pumps
(Department of Provincial and Local
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Government/ Department of Housing
2000); on the capital costs associated with
remedying the delivery backlogs (for
example, Jackson & Hlahla 1999); and on
the institutional mechanisms that must be
put in place in order to accelerate delivery
and ensure sustainability (for example,
Stavrou 2000; Jackson & Hlahla 1999).
The number of different kinds of infra-
structure and services is of course large:
these include electricity, water (for home
use and production), communications,
education, the judicial system, health care,
sanitation, housing, refuse removal, finan-
cial services, and so on.
Our purpose here is not to review or
summarise this wealth of information, but
rather to emphasise that, even when serv-
ices are present, lack of access to them is
still experienced by the most marginalised
members of communities. The SA-PPA
shows how some community members’
ability to access services is hampered by a
range of factors, some of which have to do
with the design of the services themselves,
others of which relate to the extremity of
people’s poverty. For example, even where
a health clinic does exist in the vicinity
(where it may offer free basic care),
travelling costs may still be prohibitive,
and people may find it difficult to be at
the clinic during the times when it is open
(May et al. 1997:61). Employees such as
farm workers may be reluctant to miss
work in order to visit a clinic, for fear of
being retrenched (Simbi & Aliber 2000).
Foreign workers who are undocumented
migrants may be denied access to health
services by xenophobic clinic staff (Mail
& Guardian 2000).
Crime and violence
Crime and violence contribute to the
experience of poverty at two levels. On
one level, the exposure to crime and
violence directly detracts from the quality
of life of its victims and those fearful of
being victimised. On another level, the
high incidence of crime and violence,
which forms a salient feature of everyday
life in South Africa, is symptomatic of a
profound social malaise, in which the
cycle of poverty and the cycle of violence
are indistinguishable.
Crimes such as burglary and robbery
can result in poor people losing what few
assets they have (May et al. 1997:18),
while the prevalence of violence adds to
people’s sense of vulnerability and oppres-
sion. While state-sponsored violence
ended with apartheid and political violence
has greatly subsided, violence among
people who know one another in poor
communities is rife, and is often linked to
substance abuse. A 1996 study of homi-
cide in the Eastern Cape found that 93 per
cent of all cases were linked to alcohol and
drugs; in Northern Cape, research pro-
duced similar findings, but it was also
found that most cases were related to
family disputes (CIAC 1997, cited in
Hamber & Lewis 1997).
Violence and crime are increasing in
rural areas (Hamber & Lewis 1997), and in
fact homicide rates are higher in South
Africa’s rural areas than in its urban cen-
tres (Hamber 1999). That poor people are
more likely to be victims of violent crime
is borne out by the statistics, which show
that a poor person is 80 times more likely
to be injured or killed through violent
crime than a wealthy person (Steinberg
1999, cited in Hamber 1999).
Women and children are especially
likely to be victims of violence. Women
face abuse by partners, while women and
girls are subjected to a high risk of being
raped. The incidence of rape is already
high according to official police statistics
(119 per 100 000) (SAPS 1999), but
women’s rights groups estimate that only
1 in 20 to 1 in 35 rapes are reported (Peo-
ple Opposing Women Abuse 1995, cited in
Hamber & Lewis 1997). The highest
incidence of rape is in rural areas (CIAC
1997, cited in Hamber & Lewis 1997).
Some studies suggest that the growing
incidence of rape, and particularly of gang
rape, over the past 15 years or so are
aspects of a broader ‘culture of violence’,
which in turn is a function of the pro-
tracted marginalisation experienced by
many young men (Vogelman & Lewis
1993). Arguably, the fact that economic
opportunities accessible to many young
men have not improved since 1994 despite
the political watershed of that year, has
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served only to exacerbate the experience
of marginalisation (Vogelman & Lewis
1993). It is noteworthy that, of all South
African men between the ages of 18 and
40, approximately 2–3 per cent are pres-
ently in prison.
Little hard information exists about the
extent of child abuse in South Africa.
Research conducted in 1995 showed that,
of child abuse cases reported to the SAPS
Child Protection Unit, two thirds involved
sexual abuse, and in 85 per cent of cases
the perpetrator was known to the victim
(HSRC 1995, cited in Hamber & Lewis
1997). As with rape, however, it is com-
monly supposed that the majority of child
abuse incidents go unreported.
A study of perceptions of crime in
Alexandra township in Gauteng (Stavrou
1993), stressed residents’ view that unem-
ployed youth in search of an identity and
status (for example, through gang alle-
giance) are the most apt to commit violent
and other crime, and that this was aggra-
vated by the rapid influx of residents into
the township. Residents’ quality of life was
seriously affected by the prevalence of
crime, not least because its perceived
randomness means that it is difficult to
take precautions to avoid it.13 In addition,
the personal vulnerability engendered by
exposure to violent crime is aggravated by
enduring and widespread distrust of the
police and the criminal justice system
(Hamber 1999).
On a community or social level, the
incidence in South Africa of child abuse,
broken homes, violent crime, and poverty
contribute to an inter-generational cycle of
deprivation and social malaise that is not
dissimilar to that evident in deprived
communities in developed countries and
elsewhere (Godsi 1999).14 The fact that
employment opportunities are declining,
especially for youth, serves only to rein-
force this cycle.
Lack of voice and social exclusion
One other aspect of the experience of
poverty as revealed in the SA-PPA, is that
of lack of ‘voice’, which is a growing area
of attention internationally (for example,
Das Gupta 1999; Kanbur & Squire 1999).
Broadly, people ‘have voice’ when they
feel they have an opportunity to somehow
participate in decisions that may affect
their lives, as well as having avenues to
lodge grievances with relevant authorities
and institutions if they wish. Lack of voice
was of course an acute aspect of many
people’s experience under apartheid, and
was reversed in a significant way with the
first all-inclusive democratic elections in
1994. The importance attached in the new
dispensation to local government is a
further reflection of the new government’s
earnestness to allow people these means of
expression.15
However, much of the experience of
voicelessness in South Africa, particularly
among the poor, is not at the formal politi-
cal level, but at the level of communities
and households. In their study of trends in
public participation, Roefs and Liebenberg
(2000) note that the majority of South
Africans have little understanding of the
role of local councils and Parliament (80
per cent and 73 per cent respectively), and
only a minority of poor people specifically
participate in any way in local councils or
public hearings (23 per cent and 22 per
cent respectively). However, 46 per cent of
poor respondents surveyed reported that
they participate in some sort of community
activity or organisation, and 30 per cent of
respondents indicate that community
organisations are the most appropriate
venue for addressing ‘problems in the
community’. While these figures are
encouragingly high, they underline the fact
that more marginal members of these same
poor communities are apt to have an acute
sense of social exclusion and voicelessness
in their communities. This comes through
vividly in the studies conducted as part of
the SA-PPA. Chopra and Ross (1995, cited
in May et al. 1997), for example, led their
community participants in an exercise to
identify the distinguishing characteristics
of the poorest homes in their village in
northern KwaZulu-Natal. Amongst the five
characteristics identified, low income was
not included, but not being part of commu-
nity gardens or crèches was.
Social exclusion is experienced in
distinct ways by different sub-groups. For
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the elderly, for example, the experience of
social exclusion can be the result of
fraught or absent family relationships.
Maphorogo and Eager’s study in Northern
Province (1995, cited in May et al. 1997)
identified that ‘a “bad” or “rude” daughter-
in-law is a main cause of unhappiness of
older people’, as was living without one’s
spouse. Poor support generally from one’s
children or partner is thus considered
emblematic of poverty. Apart from the fact
that loneliness diminishes one’s sense of
well-being, the absence of supportive
family members can attenuate one’s links
to the community, and render more diffi-
cult tasks such as collecting one’s pension
on pension day. A recent report by the
Ministerial Committee on Abuse, Neglect
and Ill-Treatment of Older Persons (De-
partment of Social Development 2001a),
draws a frightening picture of the insensi-
tive and/ or exploitative treatment to which
some elderly people are subjected. In
addition to the abuse directed at some
elderly people by their own family mem-
bers, the report highlights poor conditions
in residential homes, pension pay-out
points, and clinics.
For women in abusive relationships, the
sense of having voice may be critically
damaged, as for example the woman in
Teixeira and Chambers’ (1995) study in
the Eastern Cape (cited in May et al.
1997), who felt she could not insist that the
father of her children provide support for
fear of being beaten.
For homeless people, an almost defin-
ing characteristic is severed relationships
with family members, on whom they might
otherwise rely for moral and material
support. In addition, a strikingly large
number of homeless people cite as a major
problem the loss of their identity docu-
ments. On a practical level, this puts
homeless people altogether beyond the
reach of the formal economy; on a figura-
tive level, the absence of identity docu-
ments reflects the extreme nature of their
marginal status relative to society (Van der
Merwe & Aliber 2001).
Cross-border migrants are also prone to
being socially excluded. In a recent survey
of 403 cross-border migrants in Gauteng,
three quarters of the respondents signalled
discrimination and xenophobia as a major
reason for disliking South Africa (CASE
1998). Respondents indicated that the
single largest source of harassment is the
police, with the second largest source
being neighbours.16
Finally, people with disabilities face
forms of social exclusion which contribute
directly to the likelihood of their missing
out on economic opportunities. This social
exclusion operates independently of the
actual physical or mental challenges that
disabled people may face. As such, ‘dis-
abilities’ are in large measure a social
construct which has the effect of excluding
certain individuals (Yeo 2000).
Categories of chronically poor
people
We now turn our attention from aspects
of the experience of poverty, to focus on
specific groups that are especially prone
to chronic poverty. The emphasis is on
measures of income poverty, though
qualitative aspects obviously play an
important role as well. For the most part,
we try to gauge numbers of households
that are prone to chronic poverty, rather
than individuals. The reasoning is that
being a particular kind of person (for
example, disabled) is likely to contribute to
chronic poverty in a particular household
context. If the disabled and the elderly are
to be singled out as particular categories of
people vulnerable to chronic poverty, then
are we searching for the number of disa-
bled and elderly that are members of
chronically poor households, or are we
seeking something more specific, that is,
households that are likely to remain in
poverty because the main (would-be)
bread-winner is disabled or old? The
argument in favour of the latter focus is
that it may provide more useful informa-
tion as to why the household is trapped in
chronic poverty (that is, this would be due
to the nature of the individual as well as
the composition of the household). How-
ever, there is also an argument in favour of
the other approach, in that policy interven-
tion may or may not focus on the bread-
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winner, but rather on individuals within the
household who for whatever reason are
particularly well-suited to being recipients
of assistance.17
The rural poor
That poverty is especially prevalent in
rural areas, and particularly among Afri-
cans and coloureds, is already clear from
earlier sections. The national data on
poverty and unemployment, together with
some of the statistics derived from the
KIDS data, indicate that as a group, rural
blacks have a high probability of being
poor.
The particular factors that contribute to
chronic poverty in rural areas are worth
drawing attention to. First, according to the
1997 Rural survey (Stats SA 1999), there
are some 900 000 African households
living in former homelands that have no
access to arable land, 1.4 million that have
no livestock (other than chickens), and
770 000 households that have neither.
Notwithstanding the fact that most arable
plots and most herds are quite small (on
average 0.2ha and 2 large stock units),
they make a critical contribution to the
well-being of those households that have
access to them, and especially so to the
poorest households. Based on the 1993
Saldru data, it is estimated that among the
poorest 20 per cent of households in
former homeland areas having access to
arable land, agricultural production con-
tributed 35 per cent of total (actual and
imputed) income (LAPC 1996). Moreover,
as Ardington has shown (1988), poor
households in particular rely on selling
livestock to offset financial crises.
To a large extent, lack of land and
livestock is a function of the overcrowded
conditions that obtain in the former home-
lands, which in turn are the result of the
land conquest practised by the colonial
and apartheid governments. Shackleton et
al. (2000), have shown that beyond ‘con-
ventional’ land-based products such as
grains, vegetables, meat and milk, are
many other valuable products that can be
harvested or derived from the land, and
which people who may not have their
‘own’ land may nevertheless access on the
commons. However, given the great
number of people that depend on the
commons, land resources are typically
insufficient to mitigate widespread poverty.
Furthermore, formal sector employment
opportunities are scarce in many rural
areas. Mention was made above of the
rapid decline of farm employment, which
accounts for almost one third of all rural
employment opportunities. Many mine
workers retrenched in the past five years
are also remaining in or returning to rural
areas. Other conditions in rural areas that
exacerbate poverty – and thus the experi-
ence of persistent poverty – are the lack
of infrastructure and poor quality of
services, the relatively low levels of
education, the high number of single-
parent households, and relatively limited
opportunity to engage in non-agricultural
self-employment.
As a very crude first approximation to
the extent of chronic poverty in rural areas
across the country, we can take the figure
of Roberts (2000) that 30 per cent of rural
African households are chronically poor,
together with the fact that there are roughly
3.3 million rural African households
country-wide, to conclude that approxi-
mately 950 000 rural African households
are chronically poor. If we add in coloured
households, and make a reasonable adjust-
ment in light of the fact that coloured
households are less likely to be poor by a
factor of 40 per cent, then the total figure
comes to about one million households.
Female-headed households
From OHS 1999 (Stats SA 2000c), 42 per
cent of all African households, that is,
2.7 million, are female-headed. By and
large, these can be considered single-
parent households, though they may
occasionally receive remittances from
absent males. In 35 per cent of these
households, the household head is the only
adult (18 years and older) in the house-
holds. Around 17 per cent are so-called
‘granny households’, that is, the female
household head is the grandmother rather
than the mother of the children in their care.
There are many reasons why female-
headed households have a high probability
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of being trapped in chronic poverty. The
most obvious reason is that many female-
headed households rely only on the in-
come of the mother, meaning, ceteris
paribus, that adult equivalent expenditure
is likely to be low. This presumes the
female household head has an income,
which may not be the case. She may rely
mainly on child support grants from
government, or on intermittent remittances
from relatives or gifts from benefactors.
On the other hand, the household head is
as likely to have some form of employ-
ment, but there is a good chance that it will
be self-employment or employment in the
secondary labour market, resulting in a
low level of remuneration. Many heads of
female-headed households find it difficult
to pursue better employment opportunities
because they must look after their children,
since they do not have access to a crèche,
or cannot afford one, and do not have a
family member (for example, a mother)
who can oblige.
From the data provided by Roberts
(2000) on the share of chronically poor
households that are female-headed, we
can deduce that, among Africans, roughly
28 per cent of all female-headed house-
holds are chronically poor. Using the same
sort of province-by-province adjustments
used above for rural households, this
brings us to a very approximate national
figure of 767 000 African female-headed
households that live in chronic poverty.
Obviously, many of these households are
the same as those indicated above as
chronically-poor rural households. More-
over, this does not tell us anything about
the incidence of chronic poverty among
white and coloured single-parent house-
holds. A very rough estimate is that around
250 000 female-headed households of all
races are in chronic poverty in addition to
those among the rural poor.
People with disabilities
According to the 1996 census, 2.7 million
people in South Africa have disabilities, of
whom about 41 per cent are sight-disabled,
21 per cent are physically disabled, and
14 per cent are hearing-disabled (Stats SA
2000a).18 Of these 2.7 million people,
1.6 million are adults between 20 and
65 years of age.
Disabilities can vastly reduce one’s
chances of obtaining a job, can impede
one’s pursuit of self-employment in the
informal sector, and can also impose
medical and other costs that one would not
otherwise have to bear. Of course, being
disabled does not imply that there are not
other household members who earn decent
incomes.
Surprisingly, data from the 1996 census
shows that there is not such a strong link
between disabilities and unemployment.
The unemployment rate for Africans with
disabilities, for example, is 45.3 per cent,
which is only marginally above the unem-
ployment rate (broad definition) for Africans
for that year of 42.5 per cent. Likewise, for
coloured people with disabilities, the
unemployment rate is 26.7 per cent, as
compared with 20.9 per cent for all col-
oured people. Moreover, the occupational
profiles of the disabled are not very differ-
ent from those for the general population.
If we focus on the roughly 3 per cent of
disabled Africans and 6 per cent of disa-
bled coloured people that might have been
employed in the absence of their disabili-
ties, then this implies that there are around
38 000 people whom one might surmise
are ‘structurally’ unemployable.
The plausibility of this figure can be
assessed by examining the issue from a
slightly different perspective. From OHS
1999 (Stats SA 2000c), we can discern that
around 4.6 per cent of all households are
headed by disabled people. If we compare,
say, the incidence of self-reported house-
hold hunger between these households and
all other households, it is clear that house-
holds where the head is a disabled person
tend to be more deprived. First, of those
households having a child that is six years
old or younger (about 40 per cent of both
categories of households qualify), one
third of the households headed by a disa-
bled person lacked sufficient money to
feed that child in the previous year, while
this was true of one fifth of the households
headed by non-disabled people. Similarly,
households headed by disabled people
have experienced hunger (that is, for any
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household member) 27 per cent of the
time, compared with 16 per cent of the
time for other households. A crude infer-
ence is that about 11 per cent of disabled-
headed households face hunger at least in
part due to the status of the household
head. This works out, remarkably enough,
to 38 000 households. We speculate
furthermore that these households are
chronically poor in the sense that the
circumstances that maintain them in pov-
erty are not easily changed, be they the
personal attributes of the household head,
or the social forces that limit the opportuni-
ties available to disabled people generally.
This figure of 38 000 households might
appear remarkably small relative to some
of the other figures mentioned above. It
may be that, because the incidence of
joblessness and poverty is so extremely
high, being disabled is, in a sense, not
important, though it may well make one’s
poverty worse. In other words, this is an
attempt, however crude, to place a figure
on the number of households that are
chronically poor because of the disability
of the household head, which is not at all
the same thing as a figure purporting to
show how many chronically-poor house-
holds are headed by a disabled person. In
addition, it should be borne in mind that
our figure does not capture households
that may be mired in poverty due to the
high costs (in time or money) of providing
care or support to a disabled family mem-
ber other than the household head.
The elderly
Elderly people are a specific concern in
terms of poverty especially if, like the
disabled, they must fend entirely for
themselves and for dependants. Many
elderly people who do not have others on
whom to rely for support, do receive old
age grants, but it is clear from Roberts
(2000) that these grants are in no way
sufficient to keep a household out of
poverty. In other words, the widespread
allocation of old age grants is not an
indication that there are no chronically-
poor households effectively headed by
elderly people.
The problem with the concept of
chronic poverty in relation to the elderly is
that one does not expect the elderly to
improve their circumstances by finding
gainful employment. Thus to the extent a
poor elderly person manages to escape his
or her state of poverty, this would gener-
ally be because his or her household
circumstances have changed (for instance
a daughter or son has found a good job),
or some kind of financial burden has been
removed.
As is the case with the disabled, we
cannot look to the papers based on the
KIDS data for guidance as to what propor-
tion of the elderly might be in chronic
poverty.19 We therefore attempt a similar
exercise to that used for the disabled
above, that is, we look at households
where the head of household is elderly
(arbitrarily defined as 65 years or older).
Extrapolating from OHS 1999, some 4.2
per cent of households (that is, 378 000
households) might belong to the category
of poverty by virtue of dependence on a
low-earning or non-earning elderly person.
Many of these will of course be included
amongst categories already considered,
such as female-headed and rural households.
Retrenched farm workers
As mentioned above, one of the critical
factors contributing to households’ vulner-
ability and lack of opportunity is social
exclusion. Bekker et al. (1992) argue that
one group particularly susceptible to social
exclusion is former farm workers. This is
because after retrenchment farm workers
are usually evicted from the farms where
they have resided. Many retrenched farm
workers were in fact born and raised on
the farms from which they are eventually
ejected; thus they have no ‘roots’ else-
where to which they can return. (In princi-
ple these types of evictions should have
ended with the Extension of Security of
Tenure Act of 1997, but in practice this has
often not been the case.) Retrenched farm
workers are thus severed from their existing
social network – for example, other farm
workers in the immediate area – and
forced to settle, typically with little or no
savings or other capital, in townships,
squatter settlements, or in communal areas.
Some attempt to switch to seasonal
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agricultural employment, as other employ-
ment prospects may be even more limited,
given the non-transferability of farm
workers’ skills.
Agricultural employment peaked
around 1968–70 at over 1.6 million, of
whom 99 per cent were African, coloured,
or Indian (Department of Agriculture
1995). It is not possible to say how many
of these were regular, and how many were
seasonal or casual workers. Very likely
around 8–15 per cent were casual or
seasonal, and the rest regular. For 2000,
the total number of regular farm workers
was around 580 000, implying a decline
over the past three decades of some
860 000. It is impossible to say how many
of these would have been retrenched, as
opposed to having retired, died, or left
farm employment voluntarily. Also, the
fact that there are approximately 860 000
fewer regular agricultural jobs does not
necessarily imply that as many fewer
families are employed in agriculture, as
some of those retrenched or leaving for
other reasons may have been male and
female partners. As a conservative guess,
we might estimate that over this period
some 300 000 to 600 000 households lost
both employment and their residences
through the process of farm retrenchments.
AIDS orphans and households with AIDS
sufferers
AIDS orphans are defined by UNAIDS as
children under the age of 15 who have lost
their mother or both parents to AIDS. The
number of AIDS orphans is set to rise as
South Africa’s high HIV prevalence rate
among adults translates into a higher
prevalence of AIDS and then into AIDS-
related deaths. UNAIDS estimates that as
of the end of 1999, there were around
371 000 living AIDS orphans in South
Africa (UNAIDS/WHO 2000:3), while
50 000 AIDS orphans have already died
(presumably from AIDS-related causes but
also from other causes, as HIV-negative
AIDS orphans have a higher-mortality rate
than non-orphans). The Metropolitan Life
model estimates that by 2005 there will be
920 000 AIDS orphans in South Africa,
and that by 2010 there will be roughly two
million (reported in Whiteside & Sunter
2000).
By contrast, according to the 1996
census, the total number of motherless
orphans of 14 years and younger in the
country was about 400 000. This figure
presumably includes AIDS orphans at that
time, but at any rate the number of AIDS
orphans will soon account for a very large
increase in the total number of orphans in
the country.
Left untreated, adults who become
infected with HIV develop symptoms of
AIDS within 6–8 years, and most die
within 10 years. Treating HIV to delay the
onset of AIDS and opportunistic infections
will prolong life, but in the absence of
government support, this will generally be
affordable only to those who are relatively
well-off. For everyone else, the economic
effects of the infection will usually occur
when one develops AIDS, after which one
might live on average for another 3–4
years. During this period, the economic
effects on the AIDS sufferer and his or her
family can be devastating. Although many
people living with AIDS will not survive
beyond the five-year timeframe used (by
default) in this paper to define chronic
poverty, a fair number will, and their
chances of emerging from poverty under
such circumstance are remote. A study of
urban households in Côte d’Ivoire, for
example, showed that the average decline
in household income when a household
member becomes ill with AIDS is 52–67
per cent. Household health expenditure
quadruples, and food consumption de-
clines by 41 per cent (UNAIDS 1999a).
Moreover, households with one or more
members suffering from AIDS may endure
the impoverishing effects of the disease
well beyond the deaths of those members,
not least because they may have divested
themselves of all of their assets in order to
pay for health care.
Presently, there are an estimated
200 000 adults in South Africa living with
AIDS, and it is estimated that in 2005 and
2010 there will be 500 000 and 850 000
South Africans living with AIDS, respec-
tively (Health Systems Trust 2000).20
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Assuming very crudely that on average
half of those households with an AIDS
sufferer have two members infected rather
than one, there might be 375 000 and
640 000 different households directly
affected in these 2002 and 2010 respec-
tively. Because of the well-noted link
between poverty and the incidence of
AIDS, it is likely that the vast majority of
those households affected by AIDS will be
further impoverished by it. A proportion of
these households, however, would presum-
ably have counted among the chronically
poor even in the absence of the illness.
Cross-border migrants
Refugees, asylum seekers, and undocu-
mented migrants face particular kinds of
exclusion and deprivation in South Africa.
The vast majority of these people are from
the immediately neighbouring African
states seeking economic opportunities,
though asylum seekers are more likely to
come from other countries as well. Some
migrants do indeed manage to improve
their circumstances significantly, particu-
larly those with entrepreneurial skills
(CASE 1998).
The number of undocumented migrants
is by definition difficult to gauge. Esti-
mates range from 250 000 to 8 million
(National Population Unit 2000; CASE
1998). If the trend observed among visa-
overstayers is any indication (there were
an estimated 800 000 as of 2000), then
70–80 per cent have probably arrived in
South Africa since 1994.
Undocumented migrants tend to be
vulnerable because they are poor in the
first place, but also because of their un-
documented status, which makes them ripe
for exploitation of various kinds. The
Refugee Research Programme (RRP) of
Wits University has studied undocumented
migrant farm workers in Northern Province
and Mpumalanga, and found that relative
to their South African counterparts, they
are likely to be paid less (many work only
for food) and have frequently interrupted
employment spells. Stories abound of
immigrant workers who on the day before
they are to receive their monthly wages,
are suddenly discovered by the police and
deported (CASE 1998). The use of child
immigrants as farm labourers is also
widespread, and includes both children of
immigrant farm workers, and children who
have come to South Africa alone in search
of work, often because they are themselves
AIDS orphans (RRP 2000). The Depart-
ment of Labour’s own research (2000)
corroborates that commercial farmers often
prefer migrant workers over local people
mainly because they are perceived to be
more ‘obedient’. The study found that of
13 519 farm workers on commercial farms
north of the Zoutpansberg in Northern
Province, 70 per cent are undocumented
migrants.
There is little doubt that these individu-
als and families can be described as
chronically poor. However, it is impossible
to venture an intelligent guess as to how
many of the alleged 2–8 million undocu-
mented migrant workers live in circum-
stances like those of the farm workers
discussed above.
The ‘street homeless’
‘The homeless’ is an amorphous category.
This is particularly so in South Africa
where there are hundreds of thousands of
people living in informal squatter settle-
ments who do have homes, but whose
homes are obviously very unsatisfactory.
More than 100 000 of these are members
of the Homeless People’s Federation.
Many are former farm workers, whose
situation has been discussed above. Many
are wage earners in urban areas who
cannot afford decent housing there, and
for whom the costs of commuting into and
out of the city are a significant burden.
Their solution may be to pay rent in over-
crowded flats in urban slums (Lund 2000).
Those homeless living ‘on the street’
would appear to be a somewhat different
category, though there may not be a clear
line separating the two. These people, who
are often referred to as the ‘street home-
less’, are typically solitary individuals or
children rather than family units, and have
severed or lost ties with social networks
they may once have had (Van der Merwe
& Aliber 2001). The street homeless
frequently ascribe their situation to some
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sort of personal tragedy, such as being
imprisoned for a petty crime, suffering
post-traumatic stress disorder due to army
service, losing a loved one, or being
subjected to sexual or physical abuse.
The precipitating event is then often
compounded by use of alcohol and drugs,
and/or rejection by parents and other
family members. Unlike those living in
squatter camps, the street homeless are
racially diverse, and are not infrequently
from middle class or lower middle class
families. Many of the street homeless shun
missions and homeless shelters, because
they do not wish to, or are not able to,
conform to their rules.
The October Household Survey does
not pick up the street homeless by virtue of
the fact that they do not have identifiable
households. However, Olufemi (2000)
estimates that there are some three million
homeless people in the country, compared
to eight million shack dwellers. However,
Olufemi also states that there are around
7 500 street homeless in the Johannesburg
inner city (of whom 1 100 are children),
and 900 in Cape Town. That these figures
are so low relative to the national figure of
3 million may suggest that the latter figure
is too high. In her survey of street home-
less women, Olufemi finds that 8 per cent
are migrants, presumably mostly undocu-
mented.
As for other categories of people that
may sometimes be called homeless (for
example, shack dwellers), these are not
considered here to be a distinct category of
poor people for the purposes of this report,
though many belong to one of the other
categories identified, such as retrenched
farm workers.
Putting the picture together
As a final step, we assemble the numerical
estimates generated above, and attempt to
arrive at a national total figure for chroni-
cally poor households and individuals. The
purpose is not to promote an invidious
debate as to which is the most deprived
group, but rather to provide some sense of
the overall scope and composition of
chronic poverty in the country. It must be
stressed that this exercise purports to
provide no more than rough order-of-
magnitude estimates, and is subject to a
number of pitfalls. Firstly, the category-
specific estimates upon which it relies are
themselves tenuous. Secondly, we move
away from a rigorous definition of chronic
poverty as was used by Roberts (2000)
and by Carter and May (1999a; 1999b), to
a relatively fuzzy notion of vulnerability or
susceptibility to being chronically poor.
And thirdly, the categories obviously
overlap, and yet the degree of this overlap
is not easy to establish. The degree of
overlap is ascertainable for some of the
categories on the basis of survey informa-
tion (that is, rural, elderly, and female-
headed), but not for all and not with a
great degree of accuracy.
With these caveats in mind, Table 12
overleaf ventures estimates for individual
categories as well as in aggregate, where
the latter figures attempt to adjust for
overlaps among the other categories. The
two columns on the right-hand side in-
clude projections for individuals and
households affected by AIDS, in order to
provide a perspective as to the growing
relative significance of AIDS in the future.
No projections are ventured for other
categories of people or households suscep-
tible to chronic poverty.
On this reckoning, at least 18–24 per
cent of all households are presently living
in chronic poverty or are highly suscepti-
ble to chronic poverty. In addition, by
2010, AIDS may contribute to the chronic
impoverishment of an additional 26–33
per cent of households, bringing the total
share of chronically poor households to at
least 24–30 per cent. This does not attempt
to take into account the indirect effects of
AIDS on communities, such as diverted
health care resources and the burden of
caring for AIDS orphans.
Summary
This chapter had four main goals. Firstly, it
sought to review the recent work on
chronic poverty based on the KwaZulu-
Natal Income Dynamics Study (KIDS) data
set. This work established that approxi-
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mately 19–22 per cent of African house-
holds in KwaZulu-Natal are chronically
poor, in the sense that their per adult
equivalent expenditures were below the
poverty line in both 1993 and 1998.
Secondly, the section attempted to high-
light the singularly important role of
employment and unemployment, in part in
relation to the KIDS data, but additionally
in respect of longer term trends in formal
sector employment, the relative growth of
the secondary labour market, and informal
sector employment and self-employment.
One finding from the literature is that
transitions into and out of poverty are
closely related to changes in states of
employment. Thirdly, the section surveyed
the South African literature on the non-
income and experiential aspects of
poverty, on the premise that these may also
persist over time, and/or contribute to the
persistence of income poverty, even in
terms of inter-generational poverty. These
aspects included vulnerability, migration
patterns, gender roles, crime and violence,
lack of voice and social exclusion. And
fourthly, the section sought to single out
different categories of people especially
susceptible to chronic poverty, and to
venture rough estimates as to how many
such people there are in each category as
well as in aggregate. One important obser-
vation from this exercise is that chronic
poverty is not primarily attributable to
unemployment resulting from old age or
disability. Rather, the majority of the
chronically poor could be described as
people who are able and willing to work,
but for whom there are insufficient appro-
priate opportunities.
Notes
1 The ‘Saldru survey’ stands for the
household survey undertaken in 1993
under the auspices of the Southern
Africa Labour and Development
Research Unit (Saldru) of the Univer-
sity of Cape Town. Part of the signifi-
cance of the survey was that it was the
first national scale, all-race household
survey undertaken in South Africa.
2 The reasons for the attrition appear to
be various, and are the subject of
further inquiry by the project team. A
‘split-off’ household in 1998 is a
separate household formed by one or
more core members from one of the
households interviewed in 1993.
Table 12: Preliminary estimates of numbers of chronically poor households and
individuals with base year = 2000
Category Households Individuals 2005 2010




AIDS orphans 371 000 1 000 000 1 900 000
AIDS families 60 000 320 000 540 000
Former farm workers 300 000–600 000
Migrants 250 000–500 000
Street homeless 20 000–100 000
Total 1.6–2.1 million 641 000–971 000
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3 A household’s adult equivalent is
defined as ADEQ = (A + 0.5 x C)0.9,
where A is the number of adults, C
children younger than 15, and the
exponent provides for modest size
economies. This value is derived from
the ‘household subsistence level’
established by the Institute for Plan-
ning Research of the University of
Port Elizabeth. In 1993, R237 was
worth about £48 or US$72.
4 What may have happened in the
intervening years is of course not
known, which is one limitation of this
particular panel. Other panels, such
as the US Panel Study of Income
Dynamics and indeed a number of
panels conducted in developing
countries, are over a period of five or
more years but with data collected on
an annual basis.
5 Concerns have been expressed by
readers of earlier drafts that the unem-
ployment rates for rural Africans and
coloureds are too low. Stats SA notes
that its new labour survey methodol-
ogy may soon provide a more accu-
rate picture, particularly for rural
areas. It is important to note that these
figures are inclusive of informal
sector employment, which is readily
captured in the October Household
Survey. Also note that in general
figures for ‘Indians/Asians’ are not
reported in this section, as they com-
prise a very small fraction of the
workforce participants captured in the
Survey.
6 Direct comparisons in terms of in-
come are rendered difficult with the
October Household Survey, because
income from employment is reported
pre-tax, while income from self-
employment is reported both pre-tax
and without taking costs into account.
7 Keswell’s use of the term ‘out of the
labour force’ is somewhat mysterious;
it is not altogether clear that these
people should in many instances not
be counted among the unemployed.
8 Keswell also makes inferences about
race, which is difficult to understand
as the panel only consists of African
households and individuals.
9 The likelihood of such a person
ending up in 1998 as employed in the
informal sector, however, cannot be
discerned from Keswell’s table.
Excluding domestic workers, about
one third of all informal sector em-
ployment among Africans and
coloureds involves working for
someone else, while two thirds is self-
employment. Of the share that in-
volves working for someone else, a
large but unknown share involves
unpaid work for family members.
1 0 The SA-PPA consisted of 14 indi-
vidual studies undertaken in different
communities around the country, with
somewhat different emphases, and all
using participatory appraisal tech-
niques. The individual studies were
conducted in 1995, and a final syn-
thesis report was assembled by May et
al. in 1997 under the title, Experience
and perceptions of poverty in South
Africa. Apart from the SA-PPA, South
Africa has a tradition of ‘personal
histories’ of relatively poor people
which reveal much about their eco-
nomic circumstances and strategies,
including, to name a few, Bozzoli
(1991), Women of Phokeng, Keegan
(1986), Facing the storm, and Van
Onselen (1996), The seed is mine. In
addition, in 1998 the South African
NGO Coalition (Sangoco) and other
organisations sponsored the ‘Speak
Out on Poverty’ hearings, the pro-
ceedings of which are available in two
volumes, namely The people’s voice
and Poverty and human rights.
1 1 In fact, the synthesis report has a
chapter entitled ‘The poverty trap:
The context for the future’. Arguably,
however, the chapter collects observa-
tions of the researchers as to what
hinders escape from the poverty trap.
Even so, discussion elsewhere in the
report speaks vividly of people’s
perceptions of the poverty trap.
1 2 South Africa’s Chief Inspector of
Mines recently stated to the media that
some 196 000 former mineworkers
suffer from occupation-related dis-
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eases (Sapa 19 September 2000).
1 3 ‘Fear of crime and violence is wide-
spread and people panic easily.
Responses indicated that all of the
respondents have high levels of
anxiety about the prospect of personal
victimisation’ (Stavrou 1993).
1 4 A recent survey of young male pris-
oners revealed that a high proportion
of inmates experienced traumatic loss,
emotional deprivation and/or abuse as
young children (Dissel 1999).
1 5 In the words of the RDP policy frame-
work document (ANC 1994), ‘Local
authority administrations should be
structured in such a way as to ensure
maximum participation of civil soci-
ety and communities in decision-
making and developmental initiatives
of local authorities’.
1 6 Interestingly, the CASE study also
found that cross-border migrants often
do have functional social networks
within South Africa, as almost 70 per
cent of respondents indicated that
they found their present positions
through family or friends.
1 7 For example, old age pensions effec-
tively function as social welfare grants
for poor households, but the virtue of
targeting the older household member
is that this person may be more likely
to share the grant in the best interests
of the household, that is, more so than
other family members who could
possibly be recipients.
1 8 As Stats SA points out, the term
‘disability’ can mean different things
to different people as well as to
different governmental statistics
agencies, as clearly shown by the fact
that official statistics for Australia
indicate that 23 per cent of all Austral-
ians have disabilities. For the pur-
poses of the 1996 census respondents
were asked whether any household
member had a ‘serious sight, hearing,
physical, or mental disability’. One
problem noted is that the census did
not cover residents of institutions,
including those that exist specifically
to serve people with disabilities (Stats
SA 2000a:73).
1 9 Roberts (2000) reports the mean
age of household head by poverty
category, but this is not sufficient for
our purposes.
2 0 The Health Systems Trust report
projects AIDS cases under best and
worst infection scenarios. For 2005,
these are, respectively, 497 000 and
535 000, and for 2010 they are,
respectively, 805 000 and 932 000.
For our purposes, we use intermediate
figures from each range.
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The strategy of the section is to focusin turn on two broad types of intervention that impact on the poor and
chronically poor. Firstly, we survey inter-
ventions with a ‘social security’ or ‘safety-
net’ objective, that is, whose aim is to
cushion people against the effects of
poverty. Foremost here is the government’s
system of social security grants aimed at
specific groups of vulnerable people, but
civil society interventions are also critically
important in this regard. And secondly, we
survey developmental initiatives, meaning
attempts to assist poor individuals, house-
holds, and groups and to improve their
circumstances in the short or medium run.
Most development initiatives involve
training and capital investments in order to
launch income-generating projects or to
boost the SMME sector.
One overarching finding from this
preliminary survey, from both a perusal of
relevant documents as well as discussion
with key informants, is that ‘chronic
poverty’ does not figure as a distinct
category for South African institutions and
officials working on poverty and poverty-
related initiatives. While there is casual
mention of ‘poverty traps’, this does not
serve as an organising theme or suggest
particular kinds of interventions. Nonethe-
less, broadly speaking we can think of
social security measures and development
initiatives as both having a close relation-
ship to the concept of chronic poverty.
South Africa’s social security system, as
will be shown, has become less of a net
devised to catch an unfortunate few in
times of temporary distress than a major
commitment to help a large fraction of the
population over a sustained period. Absent
are the vituperative public and governmen-
tal debates about how to pry people off the
welfare rolls, and implicit is the recogni-
tion that government in particular must
support some people over a long period of
time.1 Similarly, the gathering develop-
mental impetus to provide people with
skills and other means to better their
circumstances, as exemplified in the new
‘developmental welfare’ approach intro-
duced with the 1997 White Paper for
Social Welfare, can be understood as an
attempt to help people escape their poverty
traps. However, this does not imply that
that chronic poverty as such is well under-
stood, nor that the mechanisms are in place
to combat it effectively. On the contrary,
what is still largely missing is a recognition
that, amongst the poor, there is a sub-
category of people who for various rea-
sons have particularly poor chances of
escaping poverty, not least because they
are less able to take advantage of whatever
opportunities – including these same
government programmes – may come their
4.Government and civil society
interventions
Introduction and overview
This chapter presents a survey of existing governmental and civil society
measures to address the situation of the poor and, by inference, the
chronically poor. The primary aim of the survey is descriptive, but where
possible we offer a cursory assessment of the efficacy and sufficiency of
these measures.
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way. Recognition of this heterogeneity
among poor households and individuals
might result in different types of anti-
poverty measures, or different strategies
for executing existing anti-poverty meas-
ures.2
Three important areas of government
and non-government intervention are
excluded from the present discussion.
Firstly, we do not examine infrastructure
investments and the impact these may
have on poor people’s quality of life or
economic opportunities. Secondly, we do
not touch upon interventions that may
have a longer-term impact on the nature of
poverty and chronic poverty, such as
education. And thirdly, we largely ignore
the vast number of legislative changes that
have a bearing on people’s rights or the
rights of specific categories of individuals,
such as women and the disabled; we also
exclude from consideration the various
social work services that seek to assist
such groups. That these important areas
have been excluded here should not imply
that they do not merit close attention in
any future research programme.
Within each of the two main types of
interventions that we survey – that is,
social security and developmental – we
attempt to identify the distinct roles of
various sectors. These are, firstly, govern-
ment, which includes the national, provin-
cial, and local spheres of government;
secondly, the private sector, by which we
mean the benevolent activities of private
companies, either individually through
their separate programmes, or collectively
Table 13: Typical poverty-related activities of different sectors3
Government/ Private NGOs and CBOs FBOs
Parastatal sector
Social · Social grants · Occupational · Community-based · Soup kitchens
security (for example, old insurance home-care, for
age pensions and (unemployment example, for · Health
disability grants) insurance, orphans services
medical aid, etc.)
· Subsidised · Charities, child · Shelters/
health care · Grants for welfare missions
charitable causes, organisations,
· School feeding for example, etc. [R0.5–R1.5
programmes child welfare billion]
[R1–R2 billion]





Development · Poverty Alleviation · SMME · SMME support · Income-
and job Fund investment and · Income- generating
creation support generating community
· SMME support community projects
[R0.2–R0.5 projects
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through joint initiatives or in conjunction
with government programmes; thirdly,
NGOs and CBOs (non-governmental and
community-based organisations); and
fourthly, faith-based organisations (FBOs).
The available information is scanty, and
we are left with representative examples
rather than accurate summary information.
This is particularly true for the activities of
private companies, NGOs, CBOs, and
FBOs, for which no comprehensive data
bases exist that are suitable for our pur-
poses.
Nonetheless, a summary of the main
types of initiatives and programmes is
presented in Table 13 on the previous page.
The purpose of the matrix is to indicate the
typical activities of each of the sectors in
terms of social security and development.
The table also ventures some extremely
rough order-of-magnitude estimates as to
the average annual expenditure associated
with each of the main types of initiatives.
(To avoid double-counting, the estimated
expenditure figures for NGOs and CBOs
do not include that which originates from
the government or private sectors.) Al-
though expenditure is not synonymous
with impact, the figures begin to convey a
sense of which sectors are and are not
relatively significant in these two broadly
defined areas of intervention.
Of course, there are also numerous
partnerships and funding flows between
sectors in various initiatives. For example,
many NGOs and CBOs that provide
SMME support receive funding from
government and the private sector. Put
another way, government and large corpo-
rations often reach their target clients
through the mediation of NGOs and CBOs.
The business sector sometimes combines
efforts with government through public-
private partnerships, for example, in the
provision of schools and other facilities.
Indeed, it is important to appreciate these
inter-relationships in order to understand
how the poverty is addressed. Figure 1 is a
simplistic attempt to capture this complex
picture, where the arrows represent fund-
ing flows.
The quality and completeness of our
information is variable. Government
programmes are relatively well captured,
though even there are difficulties due to
the absence of a central database reflecting
the activities of all national and provincial
departments in respect of anti-poverty
initiatives. Information on NGOs, CBOs,
and FBOs, however, is much less ad-
equate, as is our knowledge of the exact
role of foreign donors in funding these
activities.

















The government’s social security system
The South African government has a well-
established social security system which,
in terms of its sophistication and the share
of government resources it mobilises, is
anomalous among middle-income coun-
tries (Van der Berg 1997). Much of this is a
result of the system’s curious historical
development. During the apartheid era, the
two main pillars of the social security
system, namely occupational insurance
and social assistance, were established to
support whites. Occupational insurance
involved business and worker-financed
schemes, including retirement benefits,
unemployment insurance, and workers’
compensation, all eventually governed by
statute and regulation. Social assistance
(mainly old age grants, disability grants,
and child and family support grants) was
introduced by government to cater for
those who were not covered by occupa-
tional insurance, on a means-tested basis.
Over a number of decades, benefits that
were originally available only to whites
were extended to coloureds, Asians, and
Africans, but with benefit levels initially
significantly lower for members of these
other groups. However, because of the
relatively low formal sector employment
levels of Africans in particular, this gradual
process of inclusion meant in aggregate
that blacks started to capture an ever
greater share of social assistance, while the
importance of social assistance grew
relative to that of occupational insurance.
Old age pensions were not extended to
Africans until 1944, but by 1990, 67 per
cent of all old age pension expenditure
went to Africans (Van der Berg 1997). By
1993, parity of benefit levels was finally
achieved between members of different
races for the old age grant and disability
grant (Lund 1999).
However, there was one grant for which
government estimated parity would be
unaffordable. This was the State Mainte-
nance Grant (SMG), which was designed
to assist women-headed households for a
maximum (in 1996) of R700 per month,
depending on the number of children and
the extent of need. In 1997, there were
some 150 000 recipient households of the
SMG (Department of Welfare 2000a), a
figure that was disproportionately white
and coloured due to involuntarily low
uptake among Africans. Had the grant
been available with full parity to all race
groups, the total cost would have been an
estimated R13.7 billion per year
(Haarmann 1999, cited in Zain 2000), or
15 times the actual budget for the SMG for
1997. For this reason, the Department of
Welfare (now the Department of Social
Development) started reducing and phas-
ing out the SMG in 1998, a process which
was completed by March 2001. The SMG
was replaced with the Child Support Grant
(CSG), which offers a much more modest
R100 per month per child under the age of
7 years.4
Table 14 on the next page presents a
summary picture of the government’s
social security grant system for the year
1999/2000.
Some of these grants have a fairly
broad coverage, particularly the old age
grant, which is by far the most significant
in terms of numbers of recipients and total
budget. The Department of Welfare’s
1999/2000 Annual report, for example,
indicated that 70 per cent of the aged, 50
per cent of those with disabilities, and 15
per cent of children relative to a target of
30 per cent, were covered by the system. A
number of studies have furthermore estab-
lished that the old age grant in particular is
well targeted, in the sense that it reaches
poorer households (though not necessarily
the poorest), women, and rural areas (see,
for example, Lund 1999 for a concise
summary). It is also clear that in the
absence of the old age grant, many
recipients and their dependants would be
much worse off. The role of the old age
grant in facilitating job search among
working-age family members has also
been alluded to, though the disadvantages
associated with the formation of ‘granny
households’ have also been highlighted.
Relative to many other government
programmes aimed at improving the lot of
the poor, the social grant system functions
and accomplishes what it is meant to
4. Government and civil society interventions
40
Study of the incidence and nature of chronic poverty and
 development policy in South Africa: An overview
accomplish. This is not to say that there are
not criticisms of it. For example, concerns
have been raised that the coverage of the
disability grant is too limited, and that
eligibility criteria are too subjective and
poorly applied (Kimani 2000). Another
area of criticism includes the inconven-
ience of accessing pensions at pay-out
points, the time delay in having new
applications processed, the incorrect
dropping of hundreds or thousands of
grant recipients in the course of the
ongoing re-registration process, and the
inadequacy of attempts to make people
aware of their eligibility to apply for
grants, especially the new CSG.5 However,
perhaps the most serious concern that can
be raised with respect to the social grant
system is its gaps. In particular, non-
disabled working-age unemployed people
are not covered, and given the high rate of
unemployment such people are very
numerous. The rationale for an old age
grant is that the elderly (60 or more years
for women, 65 or more years for men)
cannot or should not be expected to work
and, in the absence of adequate savings or
support from family members, risk falling
into desperate poverty. However, many
individuals still in their working years find
themselves in essentially the same posi-
tion. South Africa has a high formal sector
unemployment rate relative to most devel-
oped countries, and a scarcity of resources
and opportunities for self-employment
relative to many developing countries.
A compelling – albeit counter-intuitive –
argument is that young African and
coloured men are in fact among the most
socially and economically disadvantaged
section of the population, particularly in
the absence of a state-sponsored safety net
designed to support them (Asher 2000).
Table 14: Social security grants, 1999/2000
Budget Estimated number Grant per recipient
(R million) of recipients per month (R)
State maintenance grants 891 170 000 436
Child support grants 418 348 000 100
Foster care grants 268 57 000 394
Grants for the aged 10 202 1 635 000 520
Grants for war veterans 61 9 800 520
Grant-in-aid for carers of aged 10 8 300 100
Grants for the disabled 4 192 671 800 520
Care dependency grant 81 13 000 520
Grant-in-aid for carers of disabled 4 3 000 100
Social relief 61 not available not applicable
Total 16 188 ~ 2 916 000 not applicable
Source: Department of Welfare 2000a; Department of Social Development 2000
Note: Values are in general the maximum amounts that were available in that period,
depending on the outcome of the means test. Most maximum grant levels have since
increased or been scheduled for increase, for example the old age grant is due to increase
to R570 per month in July 2001 (Department of Social Development 2001b). As of January
2000, exchange rates with the pound and dollar were £1 = R10.05 and $1 US = R6.12.
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Two other important types of social
security assistance provided by the gov-
ernment are subsidised health care and the
Integrated Nutrition Grant (formerly the
Primary School Nutrition Programme).
While these are not categorised as social
security by the government (and they
emanate from other departments), they
arguably belong to the same category.
Health care in public health facilities is
subsidised in different ways. Firstly, there
is free primary health care for all South
Africans, in terms of which public health
clinics provide certain services free of
charge. Secondly, there is free health care
for pregnant women and children up to the
age of six. And thirdly, health services and
certain medications (for example, light
painkillers) are subsidised, including those
provided through the public hospitals and
clinics. Given that there is only modest
cost recovery in the public health system,
virtually the whole public health budget –
R32 billion for 2000/01 – can be consi-
dered a form of social security assistance,
mainly focused on poorer households. Of
this, a relatively small amount, R582
million, is for the Integrated Nutrition
Grant which, according to data from the
1999 October Household Survey, benefits
roughly 45 per cent of school children
between the ages of 7 and 15.6
Notwithstanding the huge budget
dedicated to the health care system, access
to health care is still problematic in many
cases. Poor rural people remain the most
disadvantaged in this respect, in part
because they are more likely to have to
travel far to the nearest health facility and
often have difficulty paying for transport;
and in part also because they are some-
times unable to pay even the subsidised
fees for medical attention, especially if it is
an inherently costly procedure. Nonethe-
less, there is also survey information to
demonstrate that significant improvements
in access have been achieved since 1994,
for example through the building of new
clinics (Heath Systems Trust 1999).
Social security services provided
through or by the private sector
The main form of social security provided
through the private sector is ‘occupational
insurance’. Occupational insurance falls
into four main categories: retirement
benefits, unemployment insurance and
severance, workers’ compensation, and
health benefits. Taking together statutory
unemployment insurance (through the
Unemployment Insurance Fund – UIF) and
worker’s compensation, the total payouts
for 1999/2000 were estimated to be R4.5
billion (Department of Finance 2000).7
The main limitation of UIF is that it only
applies to people employed in the formal
sector, and is gauged according to the level
of one’s salary while employed. Also, UIF
benefits are available only to employees
who have been enrolled, which until
recently did not include full-time farm
employees, and still does not include
domestic workers, seasonal workers, and
of course those in the informal sector.
Benefits extend for six months following
retrenchment, at a level of 40 per cent of
one’s salary. According to the Labour
Relations Act of 1995, on termination of
employment, an employee is entitled to a
severance package of not less than one
week’s pay for each year of continuous
service, based on the rate of remuneration
at the time of dismissal.
Life assurance and medical aid schemes
are of course large industries in South
Africa, and the total annual value of
benefits paid out through them is on a par
with if not greater than the government-
financed social security system. These
benefits do not however accrue in large
measure to the poor, and are also skewed
in terms of race. For example, notwith-
standing the fact that white households
comprised only about 16 per cent of all
households in 1995, they accounted for
almost two thirds of all personal insurance
cover in that year.8 This is not to cast
aspersions on the life assurance and medi-
cal aid industries, but rather to point out
that they contribute in only a modest way
to buffering the poor against worse hard-
ship. In other words, the figures in the top
row of Table 13 should be interpreted with
great care. It should also be noted that both
statutory and non-statutory occupational
insurance are financed primarily through
members’ own contributions.
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The relative unimportance of both
statutory and non-statutory occupational
insurance to the poor is underscored by a
recent study of how unemployed people
survive (Erasmus 1999). Of the almost
2000 unemployed respondents, 81 per
cent indicated that they survived by de-
pending on some sort of assistance or
transfer: 63 per cent of these people de-
pended on assistance from a resident
family member, 32 per cent depended on
remittances, and 5.1 per cent relied on
begging. By contrast, only 4.3 per cent
and 1.8 per cent depended at all on the
UIF or the workers’ compensation fund,
respectively, and no mention was made of
any sort of non-statutory benefit. For
African respondents, dependence upon the
UIF and the workers’ compensation fund
was 3.3 per cent and 1.2 per cent respec-
tively. The implication is that occupational
insurance mechanisms do not play a large
role in providing sustenance to the unem-
ployed. This serves to emphasise the point
made above about the gaps in the social
security system. Combined with what
was reported above about the extent of
unemployment, the high incidence of
people who have never been unemployed,
the predominance of involuntary unem-
ployment, and the average duration of
unemployment, it is not surprising that
occupational insurance mechanisms play
a relatively minor role among the unem-
ployed, and by extension among a large
fraction of the poor.
Apart from occupational insurance
mechanisms, the private sector offers
philanthropic programmes that comple-
ment government’s efforts to provide
poverty relief. For example, in recent years
AngloGold has financed the building of
health clinics in areas where retrenched
mine employees reside. The Nelson
Mandela Children’s Fund relies on corpo-
rate and individual gifts to finance projects
providing direct services to children, and
approved disbursement of just less than
R17 million for 2000.
It is difficult to estimate the sum total of
these efforts, not least because there is no
database of such gifts.9 A very rough guess
is that total South African corporate giving
runs at between R0.5 and R1 billion per
year. For sake of argument, one may
suppose that about one third of this falls
into the category of promoting social
security (with the other two thirds roughly
divided between education and develop-
ment projects). Much or most of this
amount, of course, is funnelled through
NGOs and CBOs. It may be very signifi-
cant for those individuals or households
that happen to benefit, but in cash terms it
is trivial relative to the social security role
played directly by government. Where such
initiatives may have a disproportionate
impact, however, is where they combine
funding with technical expertise in col-
laboration with government, for example
to improve service delivery. This is one of
the key strategies of the National Business
Initiative, which pools resources from 181
South African and foreign companies, and
often develops partnerships with national
and provincial government departments
around specific initiatives.
Social security services provided by
NGOs, CBOs, and FBOs
As with corporate giving, there is no
database indicating the total expenditure or
total number of people reached by NGOs,
CBOs, and FBOs. We therefore attempt to
interpolate the significance of their collec-
tive role from the few bits of information
that we can assemble.
One source of information is Dangor
(1997), who reported that in 1994 the
Development Resources Centre estimated
that South Africa had 54 000 non-profit
organisations. Other estimates reported by
Dangor range from 45 000 to 80 000. The
Centre also estimated that the amount of
money which ‘circulated through the sector’
each year was in the order of R10 billion.
This is a staggering figure, representing
4.7 per cent of GNP for that year. Even if
this is true, however, it is difficult to know
what it means. In the first place, presum-
ably most of this amount is for salaries and
operational expenses such as rent and
telephones. It is impossible to estimate
how much might be left over for, say,
transfers or service provision to poor
people. Among the 108 non-profit organi-
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sations that the Centre surveyed in 1996,
46 per cent indicated that their primary
activity was education, whereas job crea-
tion was the primary activity for 27 per
cent. It would, of course, be rather hazard-
ous to extrapolate from these 108 organi-
sations to the 54 000 that were estimated.
The Department of Social Development
maintains a database of non-profit organi-
sations (NPOs) which must, by law, regis-
ter with it. The database presently includes
over 1 200 organisations, but little infor-
mation is provided about activities, levels
of funding and other factors. A large
number of those listed are daycare centres
and religious organisations, suggesting a
mix of what we term NGOs, CBOs, and
FBOs.10 Interestingly, some of the others
are group-based income generating
projects which formulated themselves as
NPOs so as to be eligible for government
funding (see Chapter 5).
Whatever the funding to NGOs, CBOs,
and FBOs used to be prior to 1994, it is
generally agreed that it is far less now, as
foreign donors have reduced their funding
to these organisations in favour of direct
support to government. Dangor reports
that in 1991, the total funding through the
three largest ‘conduit agencies’ – Kagiso
Trust, the South African Catholic Bishops’
Conference, and the South Africa Council
of Churches – was R436 million. By the
late 1990s, the funding to Kagiso from
some of its main international donors had
dropped by 90 per cent. In 1999/2000,
foreign government donors contributed
R760 million to the South African govern-
ment, of which R350 million (46 per cent)
was for the RDP Fund, and the rest was in-
kind ‘technical co-operation’ (Department
of Finance 2000). It is likely that foreign
donors’ collective contribution to the
NGO/CBO/FBO sectors is considerably
less than this. Of course, NGOs, CBOs,
and FBOs also have other sources of
funding to draw on, but these are equally
difficult to quantify. One lifeline that has
been held out to NGOs and CBOs is from
the National Development Agency (NDA),
a parastatal set up to finance them using
government and donor resources. In 2000,
the NDA was allocated about R100 million
for this purpose. Much of the R200 million
budget voted to the Department of Social
Development for direct welfare services is
also spent via NGOs and CBOs.
None of this information helps us
discern the magnitude of resources fun-
nelled through NGOs and CBOs that is
specifically for social security purposes.
Moreover, there is more to assisting poor
households than spending money. Some
information can be gathered from the same
HSRC survey mentioned above (Erasmus
1999). Of the 81 per cent of unemployed
respondents that depend on transfers or
gifts for income support, 2 per cent men-
tioned support from a charity or a church.
Of course, this may understate the role of
charities and churches in providing in-kind
support to poor people, for example
through soup kitchens and homeless
shelters. Overall, this remains an under-
researched area.
Apart from soup kitchens and shelters,
about which we have very little direct
information, perhaps the most important
areas in which the non-government, non-
corporate sector contributes to social
security is through the provision of health
facilities by FBOs. However, whereas in
the past most hospitals serving South
Africa’s rural areas were sponsored by
churches and religious organisations,
many of these have closed down or been
absorbed into provincial health depart-
ments. The majority of the remaining FBO-
related health facilities draw the bulk of
their funding from the government (Health
Systems Trust 2000). Thus the amount of
additional resources provided by FBOs in
this area is also not as great as it used to
be, though it is also difficult to quantify.
In summary, our information about the
aggregate role of NGOs, CBOs, and FBOs
in providing social security-type benefits
or services is very poor. Our shaky, indi-
rect evidence suggests that, relative to
government, these organisations play a
small but important role in this particular
area. This may, however, change in the
next few years. One area where there may
be a significant increase in social security-
type services, is in the area of community-
based care, in particular for AIDS orphans
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and AIDS sufferers. An example is Tateni
Home Care Services in Mamelodi
(UNAIDS 1999b). This may be the most
viable model for dealing with the growing
health care crisis associated with HIV/
AIDS.
Development and job creation
Government-led schemes for
development and job creation
We describe here four initiatives launched
by government in order to increase peo-
ple’s incomes through job creation or asset
redistribution: the Poverty Alleviation
Fund; the Flagship Programme for Unem-
ployed Women With Children Under Five
Years; the government’s broad strategy for
supporting the SMME sector; the Land
Redistribution Programme and the Inte-
grated Sustainable Rural Development
Strategy. This list does not exhaust all that
the government is doing by way of foster-
ing development and creating jobs, but it
represents some of the more important
initiatives, and conveys a useful idea of how
government is faring in this important area.
The Poverty Alleviation Fund
The ‘Special Allocation for Poverty Relief,
Infrastructure Investment and Job Summit
Projects’, or simply the ‘Poverty Allevia-
tion Fund’ is sometimes also referred to as
the ‘Poverty Relief Programme’. As the
name suggests, the purpose of the Fund is
broader than just job creation, but job
creation remains the main thrust. The
Poverty Alleviation Fund initially took
over the remaining RDP funds, but in
1998/99 was capitalised by the central
government with an additional R598
million, or 0.35 per cent of the total non-
interest government budget for that year.
Part of the original thinking around the
Poverty Alleviation Fund was apparently to
balance the impact of GEAR, not least in
terms of public perceptions that were
hostile to GEAR and to the closing of the
RDP Office. Indeed, the Poverty Allevia-
tion Fund continues to be very popular
with politicians. In October and November
2000, for instance, just prior to the local
government elections, there was a sudden
flurry of news stories about launches of
projects financed through the Fund,
despite the fact that the Fund had already
been around for a few years.
The way the Fund works is that national
government departments are invited to
submit proposals (‘business plans’) to the
Department of Finance (now the National
Treasury) which makes recommendations
to Cabinet. The process is independent of
departments’ normal budgeting cycle, in
part because the departments are meant to
be requesting money for functions that
they would not otherwise perform or have
not traditionally budgeted for. Indeed, one
of the original stated rationales for the
Poverty Alleviation Fund was to ‘assist
provinces in re-orienting their services to
the poor’ (Department of Finance 2000).
In the event, the Poverty Alleviation
Fund has had successes and some failures.
One major problem has been the slowness
with which allocations were officially
finalised to respective departments. In
1998/99, for instance, the allocation was
only made in November, leaving less than
five months in the fiscal year. R480 million
out of the R598 million were unspent and
then rolled over to the following year, at
which time the fund was boosted by an
additional R1 billion as a result of the
Presidential Job Summit. Roughly the
same amount was rolled over the following
year as well (Idasa 2000).
It is difficult to say how effective
spending from the Poverty Alleviation
Fund has been in terms of the Fund’s
objectives. Some of the departments to
which resources from the Fund have been
allocated have reportedly achieved signifi-
cant results, notably the ‘Working for
Water’ programme managed from the
Department of Water Affairs and Forestry,
and the Community-Based Public Works
Programme managed by the Department of
Public Works. These two accounted for
more than half of the Fund for 1999/2000.
However, the allocation to the Department
of Welfare of R204 million in 1998/99
went almost entirely unspent, and was the
source of an inquiry by the Auditor Gen-
eral as well as a great deal of public con-
troversy. The Department of Welfare
sought to compensate for its lack of man-
45
agement capacity by forging an alliance
with the Independent Development Trust, a
parastatal. While this does appear to be
solving some of the problem, the move in
itself reveals a major weakness of the
Poverty Alleviation Fund, namely that
many government departments lack the
capacity to make effective use of it. A
second problem often linked to the Fund is
that, by virtue of the apparently ad hoc
manner in which the Fund is allocated
among different departments’ business
plans, it does not form part of or contribute
to a ‘coherent, systematic and integrated
poverty reduction strategy’ (Idasa 2000:3).
More will be said about the project-ori-
ented approach in a later section. The
poverty impact of the Poverty Alleviation
Fund is presently the subject of a thorough
external evaluation.
The Flagship Programme for Unemployed
Women With Children Under Five Years
As mentioned above, developmental
programmes launched under the auspices
of the Poverty Alleviation Fund or in terms
of departments’ normal line functions tend
to be targeted in a very general way. The
most common approach in fact is to con-
centrate resources in the poorest provinces,
or to establish project approval guidelines
that emphasise the desirability of reaching
women or people in rural areas. One
important exception to this is the Depart-
ment of Social Development’s ‘Flagship
Programme: Developmental Programmes
for Unemployed Women with Children
under Five Years’. The Flagship Pro-
gramme was introduced in the 1996/97
budget year, as part of the Department of
Social Development’s ‘Developmental
Social Welfare Services’, which collec-
tively absorb roughly 8 per cent of the
Social Development budget. The alloca-
tions to the Flagship Programme were R3
million for 1996/97, R1.6 million for 1997/
98, R2.7 million for 1998/99, and R1.6
million for 1999/2000 (Department of
Welfare 2000b).
The interesting feature of the Flagship
Programme, as the name suggests, is the
specificity with which it is targeted. The
decision to create such a specialised
programme evolved from the observation
that women-headed households are very
likely to be poor, with dire consequences
for their children. Being unemployed and
living in a rural area further exacerbate this
trend, placing unemployed single mothers
at particularly great ‘risk’, and in great
need of assistance to become self-reliant
(Department of Welfare 1996). While this
does not mean that the Department of
Welfare identified this group as especially
susceptible to chronic poverty, it does
approximate this: both personal character-
istics and environmental factors are seen to
reduce the chances of lifting oneself out of
poverty.
In terms of the overall design of the
Flagship Programme, the Department
of Welfare (now Social Development)
assumes responsibility for overall manage-
ment, while provincial welfare departments
must identify pilot projects in their respec-
tive areas. The initial target number of
projects was 20 projects in all. Provinces
failing to spend their apportioned shares
would forfeit the funds. Five years later, it
is somewhat difficult to evaluate the
Flagship Programme. The 1999/2000
Annual report of the Department of Wel-
fare indicates that 15 pilots have been
implemented, incorporating 867 participat-
ing women, and 946 participating children.
Apart from raising the question of how
much of the money budgeted for the
programme has actually been spent, it
suggests that the programme could not
possibly be having a discernible impact in
the vast majority of communities. Indeed,
the fact that the Annual report still makes
use of the term ‘pilot’ suggests that the
programme is not maturing very rapidly.
The projects launched under the auspices
of the programme were evidently meant to
have become financially self-sustaining,
but this goal is proving elusive. It is pre-
mature to suggest that the programme has
failed, but the difficulties encountered are
sobering in view of the fact that the Flag-
ship Programme is, at least on paper, one
of the government’s most carefully tar-
geted development initiatives.
Support to SMMEs
Providing support to the development of
small, micro, and medium enterprises
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(SMMEs) is a key tenet of government
policy. This is so in recognition of the fact
that government has chosen not to contrib-
ute to employment growth directly through
expanding the public service (it has made
only temporary use of public works pro-
grammes). Furthermore, even if the opti-
mistic expectations of private sector em-
ployment growth were to actually take
place à la GEAR, there would still be a
high level of unemployment. One of the
vehicles for invigorating the SMME sector
is the Poverty Alleviation Fund itself. For
example, of the projects that the Depart-
ment of Social Development (Welfare) has
sought to establish, through its share of the
Fund, a large number of income-generating
community-based projects, often agricul-
tural or small-scale manufacturing. How-
ever, a completely different approach for
supporting the SMME sector has emanated
from the Department of Trade and Industry,
which has spawned two parastatals,
namely Khula Enterprise Finance Ltd. and
Ntsika Enterprise Promotion Agency. The
main function of Khula is to wholesale
finance to accredited SMME-oriented retail
finance institutions (RFIs) and micro-credit
outlets (MCOs). The performance of Khula
has been questioned on account of the
disappointing uptake from retailers, as well
as the poor controls that contributed to the
failure in 1999/2000 of three of the largest
and most promising of the 20 or so RFIs.
Notwithstanding these problems, the
establishment of Khula is guided by a clear
rationale, namely, that while entry into
self-employment in the informal sector is
not costless, the mainstream commercial
banks are averse to devoting resources to
this sector, and the burgeoning micro-
lending sector is oriented predominantly to
high-cost consumption loans. The high
incidence of SMME failure and poor loan
repayment continue to place a strain on
remaining RFIs. In a bid to survive, some
of these remaining RFIs are moving up
towards the top end of the SMME scale.
The relatively newer MCOs, meanwhile,
which are specifically geared to focus on
the lower end of the SMME scale, have
adopted a step-up design together with
something like a peer-monitoring
approach. Whether or not the peer moni-
toring aspect will be applied in a suffi-
ciently rigorous fashion remains to be
seen. Presently a fair number of the MCOs
are struggling with poor repayment rates.
The other main arm of the SMME
support strategy, Ntsika, seeks to provide
advisory services to existing and new
SMMEs. Ntsika reaches its clientele largely
through its Local Business Service Centres,
of which there were over 80 in 2000
(BRAIN 2000). One data bank lists an-
other 300 to 400 NGOs and companies
which exist to support the SMME sector
(BRAIN 2000).
Land redistribution and rural development
As pointed out above, one of the damag-
ing legacies of the colonial and apartheid
past is the inequitable distribution of
agricultural land between race groups.
Apart from being a source of ongoing
social tension, this means that many poor
households with poor employment pros-
pects, have limited opportunities for
providing for themselves through subsist-
ence production or commodity production.
The problem is threefold: many rural
people are essentially landless; many rural
people who do have access to land have
very little land or very poor land, or both;
and rural households having access to land
often fail to derive much economic benefit
from that land, even in terms of subsis-
tence production. Lack of financing,
training, and market access are among the
problems faced by smallholders. Scores of
rural people therefore incur the disadvan-
tages of being in rural areas – that is, in
areas where there are few employment
opportunities, underdeveloped infrastruc-
ture, and scarce amenities – without really
benefiting from the advantages of land
access.
The government’s Land Reform Pro-
gramme was anticipated in RDP docu-
ments before the 1994 elections. The
programme, introduced by the Department
of Land Affairs, comprises three main
parts: restitution, whereby people seek
restoration of land from which they were
forcibly removed (or equivalent redress);
redistribution, whereby other people
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desiring to own or access land are pro-
vided an opportunity to do so with the
assistance of government financing; and
tenure reform, involving the introduction
of more secure forms of landholding
among previously disadvantaged people
that already have access to land.
We focus here on redistribution, mainly
because it is the aspect of the Land Reform
Programme that has the most overt devel-
opmental goals. Since 1995, with the
introduction of the Land Reform Pilot
Programme, redistribution has accounted
for the transfer of just under 0.6 per cent of
the country’s agricultural land to around
60 000 black households. Another 0.3 per
cent has been transferred in terms of
municipal commonages, whereby land is
vested in the municipality and is then
made available to low income households,
mainly for the grazing of their livestock.
To date, the vast majority of the land has
been acquired from private landowners
who willingly sold their property. The total
capital expenditure on the redistribution
programme between 1995 and 2000 was
around R820 million (in 2000 rand). At its
peak in 1998/99, the capital expenditure
represented about 0.2 per cent of the total
government budget excluding interest.
The original vision of the land redistri-
bution programme, as set out in the 1997
White Paper on Land Policy, embraced the
transfer of land for a variety of purposes,
including secure tenure, land for subsist-
ence purposes, and commercial produc-
tion. However, the primary mechanism for
the redistribution programme, the R16 000
per household Settlement/Land Acquisition
Grant, revealed that the core thrust of the
programme was certainly not commercial.
However, even from very early on, there
was a damaging lack of clarity as to the
economic goals of redistribution. The vast
majority of redistribution projects were to
groups of households that formed commu-
nal property associations or trusts. These in
turn functioned not only as legal entities
for the purposes of holding land, but
typically attempted to operate commercial
enterprises as a group. Often this meant
attempting to carry on with the farming
enterprise taken over from the land seller,
frequently with dubious embellishments
proposed by an agricultural engineer
commissioned to assist applicants with
their ‘business plans’ (Aliber 1999). The
poor performance of many projects was a
consequence of confusion as to what sort
of economic empowerment was possible
within the confines of the grant instrument
provided and the organisational form
assumed by beneficiary groups. In addi-
tion, the rate of delivery has been well
below initial expectations and, indeed,
promises.
Despite a lengthy review of the land
redistribution programme occupying much
of 1999/2000, the Department of Land
Affairs and the Department of Agriculture
introduced a new programme that still
reveals confusion as to the economic role
that land redistribution can play. The
revised redistribution programme was
authored by a joint team from the World
Bank and a South African university that
was also charged with developing the new
Integrated Sustainable Rural Development
Strategy (ISRDS) on behalf of the Office of
the President. As explained in one of the
background papers to the ISRDS, a key
tenet of the ISRDS is that, by resolving
inefficient factor distortions (that is, land to
labour) and harnessing growth linkages, a
properly formulated redistribution pro-
gramme can ‘catalyze widely shared
growth’ in the rural economy (Brooks et al.
2000). The two primary points of differ-
ence from the earlier redistribution pro-
gramme are, firstly, that henceforth all
applicants must make an own contribution
in order to qualify for a grant, and,
secondly, that grants will be available in a
range, the small end of which is effectively
more than three times the size of the old
grant.
Whether or not the revised model of
redistribution will prove more viable than
the old one is difficult to say, and will be
an important area of future research. An
unwieldy implementation system may
impede delivery to such an extent that the
efficacy of the model will be difficult to
observe. On the other hand, if delivery
does recover, there are reasons for pessi-
mism that the programme will serve as an
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engine of rural development. First and
foremost, the new strategy was designed
in ignorance of the nature of the demand
for land, which is overwhelmingly for
subsistence-sized plots (LAPC 1997).
Secondly, evidence from former homeland
areas, where land allocations between
households are often highly inequitable,
suggests that beyond a very modest
threshold, black commercial farmers adopt
labour-saving production strategies that are
very similar to those of their large white
commercial farmer counterparts, and thus
contribute little or negatively to labour
use and demand. And thirdly, the new
programme reveals little comprehension
of the various non-agriculture benefits
accruing to land access (Shackleton et al.
2000), which can be reaped more easily if
land is not apportioned in large amounts to
a relatively small number of beneficiary
land owners. Indeed, the unfortunate
consequence of pursuing an ill-conceived
commercialisation-equals-growth redistri-
bution strategy, is that the genuine
economic safety-net potential of land
redistribution will be neglected. The
ISRDS does however have some important
virtues. The most significant of these is
that it seeks to provide a mechanism to
improve inter-departmental communica-
tion and co-ordination.
Development and job creation through
the private sector
The private sector’s role in promoting
income-generating projects and SMMEs
probably rivals what the government is
presently able to do. A large (but un-
known) share of private companies’
‘social responsibility’ spending falls into
this category, and is probably not less than
R300 million per year. Companies use
different strategies for pursuing these
goals, including contributing money to
professional grant-making institutions such
as the National Business Initiative, linking
up to development-oriented NGOs and
CBOs, linking directly with government,
and establishing their own programmes.
Some companies have hired development
professionals to help them assess opportu-
nities to make contributions or to under-
take training of recipients (for example,
AngloGold), while others have established
their own offices for providing services
directly to aspiring entrepreneurs. As an
example of the latter, Eskom, Mondi,
Nedcor, South African Breweries, Standard
Bank, and Hollard have each introduced
special units that seek to provide financial
and/or technical support to SMMEs or
emerging franchise operators. Arguably,
the private sector-led initiatives furnish a
greater degree of technical support relative
to cash than kindred government-led
initiatives, though the results are probably
similarly uneven.
Development via NGOs, CBOs and
FBOs
NGOs and CBOs play a critical role in
conducting the developmental groundwork
on behalf of government and the private
sector: broadly speaking, government
looks to NGOs and CBOs to mobilise
income-generating projects and commu-
nity development projects, whereas the
private sector relies on NGOs and CBOs to
support SMMEs. Needless to say, this is
not always the case. Some NGOs and
CBOs mobilise funds from foreign donors
for similar purposes, but this appears to be
the exception rather than the rule, not least
because of the redirection of donor money
since 1994 towards government (Dangor
1997). One important conduit of develop-
ment funding for NGOs was the Transi-
tional National Development Trust
(TNDT), which channeled government
and foreign donor money to NGOs for a
variety of poverty alleviation activities.
According to the TNDT’s annual report
of 1998/99, of the R106 million that was
disbursed since 1996, 17 per cent has been
for SMMEs, while another 12 per cent has
been for ‘rural development’ (TNDT
1999). Most of the rest went to education,
training, and health. The newly constituted
National Development Agency (NDA),
which took over from the TNDT in 2000,
was in that year allocated another R100
million, presumably to pursue a similar
range of activities. The advantage of this
approach is that the NDA can attract the
necessary skills to ensure that development
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funds are disbursed to NGOs that are likely
to make successful use of them, unlike
poverty relief funds emanating directly
from government departments, which tend
to be ‘thrown around’ (to use the words
of one frustrated government employee).
However, as NDA staff indicate, the de-
mand expressed by NGOs for financial
support hugely exceeds the NDA’s re-
sources (Sokalis 2000).
Less is known about the extent to which
FBOs are involved in these types of activi-
ties, though this would appear to be far
less common than their involvement in the
provision of welfare-oriented services.
Summary
This chapter presented an overview of the
anti-poverty activities of government and
civil society, and provided as well a
number of examples of these activities.
These anti-poverty activities were divided
into two broad categories, firstly those with
a social security goal, and secondly, those
designed to foster development and job
creation. In terms of social security, the
government’s system of social grants is
by far the most important intervention
reaching low-income households. And,
notwithstanding the Department of Social
Development’s commitment to embrace a
more developmental approach, these
grants are likely to remain an indispen-
sable part of the country’s anti-poverty
efforts for the foreseeable future. Social
security services provided by or through
the private sector are of an equal magni-
tude, but are not on the whole directed at
low-income households, many of whom
lack formal sector employment or are
employed only in the secondary labour
market where such benefits are usually not
available. CBOs, NGOs and FBOs, play a
critical role in providing a number of
specific services to poor individuals and
households, but this role has not been
comprehensively captured in this report.
Government spending on development
and job creation is far more modest, not
least because, unlike social security spend-
ing, these are mostly new areas of activity
since 1994, but also because they are
inherently more difficult to accomplish.
The section paid special attention to three
government initiatives, namely the promo-
tion of income-generating ‘projects’, the
promotion of SMMEs, and land redistribu-
tion. These initiatives, while laudable, have
arguably had little overall impact in reduc-
ing poverty, in part because of their small
scale, and in part because even at the
micro level they often fall short of their
desired impact. The activities of the private
sector, and of CBOs, NGOs and FBOs
have been equally spotty in terms of
development and job creation.
Notes
1 Arguably, one reason this debate is
absent is that the system offers rela-
tively little to the working-age unem-
ployed. Even so, proposals for a basic
income grant have been met with little
public opposition, suggesting a broad
recognition that poverty is endemic
and for many people enduring.
2 There is admittedly some recognition
of this heterogeneity, as shown for
example in the attempts to target
certain groups, for example, rural
women, and the poorest geographical
areas. However, it remains very crude.
The issue of targeting is addressed in
Chapter 5.
3 The assistance of Professor Anthony
Asher in quantifying various catego-
ries is gratefully acknowledged. Note
that the figures may or may not be
inclusive of personnel costs, depend-
ing upon whether the benefit consists
primarily of cash transfers or of
services rendered. As of October
2000, R1 billion was worth about
£92 million or US$134 million.
4 The cancellation of the SMG in favour
of the CSG has been harshly criti-
cised. One line of argument is that
were it not for the budget stringency
imposed by GEAR, the state could
indeed afford to offer the SMG to all
deserving of it (Zain 2000). Perhaps a
more convincing criticism is that the
cut-off age under the CSG of 7 years
is too low. Partly in light of the initial
flurry of criticism, the R75 per month
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per child originally proposed by the
Lund Committee was raised to R100.
5 It needs to be noted that the increase
in uptake of the CSG between 1999/
2000 and March 2001, from 312 000
to 1.1 million (Department of Social
Development 2000b), is quite satis-
factory, if not an indication of the
intensity of the need for these grants.
6 This figure could overstate the reach
of the Integrated Nutrition Grant, in
that the October Household Survey
does not distinguish what food distrib-
uted freely at school is financed by
the grant as opposed to other sources.
Moreover, it should be noted that the
Integrated Nutrition Grant consists of
a mid-morning snack, and does not
aim to meet the entire nutritional
needs of school-age children.
7 The Department of Finance also
reports that the payouts for the Road
Accident Fund in 1999/2000 were
around R2.1 billion. The Road Acci-
dent Fund is supported through a
special levy on petrol and diesel.
8 Based on data from the Income and
Expenditure Survey of Stats SA
(1997). Unfortunately, more up-to-
date statistics are not available.
9 The Southern African Grantmakers
Association (SAGA), in 1998 pub-
lished a Donor directory of just over
300 South African and multinational
companies and foundations which
extend grants to community projects
and other initiatives. Unfortunately,
only 70 of these disclosed their
expenditure (a total of R242 million
for 1998), and these are not broken
down according to specific recipient
sectors.
1 0 The distinction between NPOs and the
private sector entities is also fuzzy.
For instance, the National Business
Initiative is technically an NPO, but
given the manner in which it was
created and is budgeted, has a greater
affinity (for our purposes) to the
private sector.
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African Human Rights Commission’s
Second economic & social rights report,
1998–1999’ (2000) make any allusion to
the distinction between chronic and transi-
tory poverty.
As mentioned above, the government’s
broadly two-fold approach to poverty –
safety net and development – can be
construed as an implicit recognition of this
distinction, but only very crudely. That is,
there might be a recognition that many
poor people are stuck in a poverty trap, but
developmental programmes do not gener-
ally attempt to target those who are most
likely to be chronically poor.1
That ‘chronic poverty’ has not entered
people’s lexicon may owe something to
the fact that, until relatively recently, there
has been little research activity in South
Africa focusing on it. Only with analyses
based on the KIDS data have there been
quantitative estimates as to the incidence
5. Constraints and challenges to
addressing chronic poverty in
South Africa
Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to reflect on what inhibits government –
and to a lesser extent civil society – from better addressing the situation
of chronically poor people. The chapter focuses on three main issues.
Firstly, we draw attention to the fact that there exists no specific strategy
to address chronic poverty, and furthermore that there are obstacles to
the development of such a strategy. Secondly, we revisit the issue of
formal sector unemployment and self-employment. The key question here
is whether government’s approach to stimulating entrepreneurship is such
as to provide opportunities for the poorest of the poor to escape
poverty. And thirdly, we touch on the issue of HIV/AIDS, and what
it means and will mean in particular for those living in marginal rural areas.
Absence of a strategy for the
chronically poor
‘Chronic poverty’ has not entered the
lexicon
In the course of speaking to government
officials who deal with anti-poverty pro-
grammes for the purposes of researching
this report, it was established that the
distinction between chronic and episodic
poverty – whatever terms are used – is not
observed: that is, it is not a distinction that
government officials are aware of when
devising policies or evaluating progress.
Government documents also reflect the
fact that ‘chronic poverty’ is not regarded
as a distinct dimension of poverty. Neither
Stats SA’s recent volume Measuring pov-
erty in South Africa (2000b), nor the
Department of Social Development’s
recent National report on social develop-
ment, 1995–2000 (2000), nor the South
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of chronic poverty, and this only for
KwaZulu-Natal. In addition, we might
speculate that the problems of poverty and
inequality are so vast that the distinction
between chronic and episodic poverty
might appear somewhat esoteric to many
observers.
At any rate, given that this distinction
is not generally acknowledged, it is not
surprising that there are few government
programmes that seem to be geared
specifically to addressing chronic poverty.
Now that there are a number of research
reports based on the KIDS data, will
there be a shift in government (and non-
government) policy? This would appear
to be unlikely in the short-term. Key
respondents interviewed for this report
indicated that even academic research that
is specifically commissioned by and for
government, mainly ends up unread on
civil servants’ bookshelves. Officials
responsible for co-ordinating anti-poverty
initiatives for KwaZulu-Natal (by all
accounts one of the better organised
provincial programmes) were not even
aware of KIDS or the published analyses
based on the KIDS data. Within govern-
ment circles, there is a fair amount of
disillusionment about the usefulness of
academics and consultants, while among
academics and consultants, there appears
to be an equal measure of scepticism about
the delivery capacity, intellectual capital,
and institutional memory of government.
There is no overarching anti-poverty
strategy
A number of officials interviewed ex-
pressed a concern at the absence of an
overarching anti-poverty strategy. Notwith-
standing the creation within government of
co-ordinating clusters at national and
provincial level, the feeling was that these
were not in service of an actual strategy
that precisely articulated goals and roles.
Moreover, no system exists to help harmo-
nise or identify the respective roles of
government and the private sector in
poverty reduction. Idasa (2000) raises the
concern that the present emphasis on
solving the problem of underspending
from the Poverty Alleviation Fund, while
important, is doing little to solve the bigger
problem of ‘the absence of a coherent and
systematic framework for poverty reduc-
tion’. Ben Turok, member of Parliament
for the ANC, writes that the central reason
for government’s ineffectiveness in ad-
dressing poverty is not lack of commit-
ment (which is belied by large budget
allocations to social services), but the
absence of a ‘special ministry of economic
development’, the main purpose of which
would be ‘to develop a coherent,
intersectoral poverty and development
strategy and synchronise policy between
departments’ (Business Day, 23 November
2000).
Perhaps the creation of such an
overarching strategy would provide an
opportunity to government to reflect on the
heterogeneous nature of poverty, including
inter alia the distinction between chronic
and episodic poverty. We would go further
and say that this could be a critical distinc-
tion which should inform any anti-poverty
strategy – which is not to say that it is the
only one. It would constitute a more
thoughtful approach to targeting than the
one that presently obtains, which mainly
seeks to focus anti-poverty resources on
the ‘three poorest provinces’.
The limits to ‘development by
piggeries’
Government-led and government-funded
development interventions are hindered by
a paucity of ideas about how to help
people help themselves. One manifestation
of this is that, in some provinces, one finds
the welfare department, health department,
and agriculture department all independ-
ently attempting to launch community
agricultural projects, often to the frustra-
tion of the agriculture department (for
example, KwaZulu-Natal Director Gener-
al’s Office 2000). In some provinces,
different departments may collaborate or
co-fund rather than duplicate or compete
(for example, in Northern Province, the
health department has made funds avail-
able for community gardens to be imple-
mented by the agriculture department), but
the point remains that agricultural projects
are inordinately popular, probably for lack
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of alternative ideas about what can be
done. One astute observer working with
anti-poverty programmes within govern-
ment has dubbed this ‘development by
piggeries’, not only because of the wide-
spread over-subscription to agricultural
projects (which also figure prominently in
the Department of Social Welfare’s Flag-
ship Programme), but more generally
because this piecemeal project-by-project
approach has ultimately not reached either
very broadly or very deeply. The project-
by-project approach is costly to administer,
often fails to reach the poorest of the poor
(because funding is more likely to be
secured by those who are relatively well
organised, rather than those who are most
in need), and is virtually always based on
the rather problematic ‘group approach’.
By the ‘group approach’, we mean that
the project involves a group of members
who are expected to work and profit as a
group. Projects sponsored by the Gauteng
Department of Social Development, for
example, must be registered as non-profit
organisations, which cannot have fewer
than ten members according to the
Nonprofit Organisations Act 71 of 1997.
As with similarly constituted land redistri-
bution projects, these projects have a high
mortality rate due to age-old problems
such as lack of accountability and free-
riding.
In essence, the government is strug-
gling with a paradox. On the one hand,
having embraced ‘developmental welfare’,
the government wishes to see people
become economically self-sufficient and
thus no longer reliant upon social security
grants for survival. People must learn to
provide for themselves by being entrepre-
neurial. However, government is intrinsi-
cally ill-suited to nurturing entrepreneurs.
Social workers and other civil servants
make poor extension agents for helping
people launch and manage income-gener-
ating projects, partly for lack of sufficient
technical expertise, and partly for lack of
their own entrepreneurial experience (IDT
2001). Moreover, the ‘group approach’
might itself have the effect of reducing the
ability to reach the most marginalised.
Probably the most efficacious government
interventions for job creation at present are
the Community Based Public Works
Programme and the Working for Water
programme, which are run by the Depart-
ment of Public Works and the Department
of Water Affairs and Forestry respectively.
Both are funded, at least in part, through
the Poverty Alleviation Fund. One princi-
pal reason for their success (relative to,
say, the Department of Social Develop-
ment’s efforts to support income-generat-
ing projects) is that they do not require
government to do what it is not qualified to
do. A second reason is that the market for
their ‘products’ is given, whereas for
income-generating projects such as pig-
geries, the market may not be proven.
Having said this, it is important to state that
the efforts of governments and others to
support and invigorate the SMME sector
are absolutely critical and a good start has
been made. If these efforts have not so far
had the desired effect, that is in no small
part a consequence of the enormous size
and complexity of the task.
Employment and
unemployment
A major challenge facing the country’s
ability to reduce poverty is the high rate of
unemployment in the formal sector and
low rate of SMME growth in the formal
and informal sector. One reason house-
holds remain in poverty is because their
members repeatedly fail to gain employ-
ment over sustained periods. The prospects
for employment growth in the formal
sector are therefore a key consideration in
the future extent of chronic poverty. In a
previous section, it was shown that the
government’s projections as depicted in
the initial GEAR document were overly
optimistic. The question is whether there is
any reason to hope that the situation will
change in the near future. If not, govern-
ment and civil society must look elsewhere
to see what can be done to address the
needs of the chronically poor.
It is a fairly safe conjecture that formal
sector employment growth is not likely
to take off in the near future, particularly
as the government remains loathe to
embark on an ambitious expansionary
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macroeconomic policy. Prospects are
especially bleak for unskilled and semi-
skilled employment, where demand is
most slack. Even in commercial agricul-
ture, which has traditionally been a labour-
intensive sector, unskilled workers are
gradually being replaced by machinery,
contributing to higher rural unemploy-
ment. While the weakening rand may have
somewhat changed the perception that
South Africa is a high labour-cost
economy, technological change in the
manufacturing industry is following the
same trend. The prospect of AIDS-induced
labour cost rises will no doubt further
propel this trend (see below). In addition,
informal sources indicate that government
is gearing up for a large-scale retrench-
ment over the next five to ten years.
Taking into account both parastatals
(Telkom, Eskom and others) and the public
service itself, 600 000 to 1.2 million
workers could be retrenched within that
time frame, representing up to a staggering
15 per cent of the present formal sector
workforce.2
This sobering prospect means that, at
least over the next 10 to 20 years – that is,
as one generation of the economically
active population is replaced by the next –
the formal economy is unlikely to contrib-
ute substantially to the reduction of
chronic poverty. Even if the thrust to
improve skills in mathematics, science,
and information technology is successful,
this will do little to benefit large segments
of the population.
This implies that the onus will be on
government and civil society to make up
the difference. The two main areas in
which they can attempt to do so are public
works programmes and SMME promotion,
with the social security system remaining a
critical safety net. Much therefore depends
upon government’s capacity to manage
interventions of this kind. In its response to
the most recent government budget unveil-
ing, Idasa argues that this is precisely
where government is most deficient,
casting doubt that it can spend (and spend
effectively), the budget amounts it has
allocated for, say, human resource devel-
opment and infrastructure development
(Idasa 2001).
Beyond this, however, too little is
understood about the potential role of the
SMME sector in the economy. To what
extent does SMME growth depend on the
growth of the formal sector economy? Will
SMMEs remain predominantly ‘survivalist’
activities, or can they serve as engines of
broad-based growth? What are the pros-
pects for SMME growth in rural areas? To
what extent does SMME growth depend on
the population at large having larger
disposable incomes, even if these are
derived from social security grants? If a
‘basic income grant’ is introduced (like
that presently being studied by the Portfo-
lio Committee on Welfare and Population
Development), what will this mean for the
expressed demand for the goods and
services rendered by SMMEs? How effec-
tive are such indirect means of supporting
SMMEs, relative to the variety of measures
now in place? And finally, even if self-
employment through SMMEs takes off,
who will be able to share in the opportuni-
ties, and who will be left out?
The final issue we wish to draw atten-
tion to here is the role of asset redistribu-
tion via the land redistribution programme.
The contention here is that there has been
no satisfactory resolution to the debate
about whether land redistribution can serve
as an efficacious strategy for employment
creation. The newly formulated redistribu-
tion programme and rural development
strategy hold that it is, but back-of-the-
envelope calculations suggest that there
is plenty of room for doubt. For example,
suppose that in the next 15 years, govern-
ment is in fact able to accomplish its
avowed goal of redistributing 30 per cent
of private farm land, plus all available
agricultural state land, and that this is
all dedicated to settling commercial
farmers. This implies an amount of about
25.6 million ha. If farms are designed
with the idea of providing each beneficiary
with enough land to earn a modest net
farm income of R15 000 per year, then this
would imply (in theory) around 280 000
beneficiaries, or 11–14 per cent of rural
unemployment. The total cost would be
(very roughly) around R27 billion, or
R97 000 per beneficiary, or R1.8 billion
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per year over 15 years. Private sector debt
and own contribution might contribute up
to 30 per cent of this. However, since the
vast majority of this redistribution would
be in terms of acquired private land,
numerous farm jobs would also be lost.
Given the 30 per cent target mentioned
above, roughly 200 000 farm worker jobs
would be lost. The net gain of 80 000
represents an almost negligible share of the
rural employed. The social and economic
dislocation would probably far outweigh
the modest gains. Even counting on the
fact that the 280 000 beneficiaries would
in theory have larger incomes than the
displaced farm workers, it is unclear
whether this would do much to stimulate
the rural economy. A large share of the
income would in fact go to debt servicing,
at least for the medium term. Of course,
these estimates are all hypothetical. In
practice the redistribution programme will
not be weighted exclusively towards one
type of small-scale commercial farmer.
The point, however, is that land redistribu-
tion may not fulfil expectations that will
serve as the engine of rural economic
revitalisation, and the opportunity exists to
introduce other ways of pursuing land




The last issue we touch on in this chapter
is HIV/AIDS, and its implications over the
next few decades for the economy at large,
and for marginal rural areas in particular.
At least two macroeconomic modelling
exercises have been conducted which seek
to illustrate the potential impact of HIV/
AIDS on the South African economy. In
the one, ING Barings (2000) identifies
seven ‘key impact channels’ that link the
demographic effects of AIDS to the South
African economy:
a lower labour force
lower labour productivity through
absenteeism and illness
cost pressures for companies through
higher benefit payments and replace-
ment costs
lower labour income, as employees
bear some of the AIDS-related costs
lower population translating into lower
expenditure
increased private sector demand for
health services
higher government expenditure on
health services.
While the focus here is on the impact
of AIDS on the formal economy, the
implications are wide reaching. For exam-
ple, lower disposable household income
means lower demand for services that
might be provided by SMMEs; higher state
expenditure on health care may displace
government attention from anti-poverty
initiatives; and household resources
depleted by caring for ill family members
will become unavailable for investment in
own enterprises.
A simulation study by Arndt and
Lewis (2000) examines similar ‘channels’,
and arrives at similar conclusions. One
important conclusion is that, relative to the
no-AIDS scenario, there will be similar
unemployment rates for unskilled and
semi-skilled workers: ‘The net effect of
AIDS-related mortality and slower growth
is to leave the unemployment rate largely
unchanged’ (2000:17). The implication,
however, is that, in absolute terms, the
number of unemployed people will fall
proportionally to the decline in the number
of economically active people due to the
higher mortality rate.
Research conducted in rural areas of
other African countries suggests that the
impact of AIDS in South Africa’s rural
areas will have especially grave implica-
tions for vulnerable groups. Cohen (1997)
and Ayieko (1998), for example, have
undertaken case studies showing that
households with an AIDS sufferer fre-
quently seek to keep up with medical costs
by selling livestock and even land. Baier
(1997) shows that women who are wid-
owed due to AIDS sometimes lose rights to
land, adding to an already precarious
situation. Baier (1997) and Cohen (1998)
draw attention to the manner in which
AIDS can cause affected households to
become socially excluded, thus diminish-
ing their ability to cope with further crises.
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Similarly, extended family networks
sometimes collapse, not least due to the
pressure of having to support orphaned
children (Halkett 2000). Topouzis and du
Guerny (1999) note that in a number of
countries, the HIV/AIDS epidemic has
resulted in a return to rural areas of com-
munity members who have been living
and working in towns and cities. It can be
anticipated that in South Africa, one certain
effect of growing AIDS-related mortality
will be ever more intense pressure on
grandparents. ‘Granny households’, in
which grandmothers could care for their
grandchildren, thereby enabling their
children to derive an income, will increas-
ingly be called upon to raise children
whose parents have died. This suggests
that the present system of old-age grants
may soon be due for an overhaul. This, as
well as other possible effects of the epi-
demic, will have to be studied carefully as
the epidemic progresses.
Summary
This chapter has enumerated a number of
challenges facing government and civil
society in respect of tackling chronic
poverty. At the most basic level, neither
government nor, arguably, civil society, are
in an optimal position to address chronic
poverty because a strategy does not exist
for doing so. ‘Chronic poverty’ is not a
term which has entered the lexicon of
either policy makers or development
practitioners; it remains an esoteric interest
of sundry academics.
While government anti-poverty initia-
tives do sometimes ostensibly target
especially deprived or vulnerable groups,
it often proves very difficult to reach such
groups, mainly because those that succeed
in attracting government or civil society
assistance tend to be those who are most
vocal or best organised. Most targets,
moreover, are defined spatially, in that
anti-poverty programmes prioritise the
poorest provinces or poorest districts.
While this is not in itself a bad strategy, it
may not be sufficient to address the plight
of the chronically poor.
A second challenge to addressing
chronic poverty is the probability that
formal sector employment will fail to
expand dramatically in the near future.
Prospects are especially bleak for unskilled
work. This implies that if chronic poverty
is to be reduced then the SMME sector will
have to take up the challenge. The fact that
the SMME sector is only partially able to
do so now (among Africans and coloureds,
there are more than five times as many
unemployed people as there are employed
or self-employed in the informal sector,
excluding domestic workers) suggests as a
necessary condition that government and
civil society will have to step up their
efforts considerably. Whether this will be a
sufficient condition, however, is doubtful.
One key question is whether markets for
the goods and services that SMMEs pro-
vide are sufficiently large. Another key
question is whether an increasing number
of SMMEs can move beyond the
‘survivalist’ mode and thereby provide an
escape route from poverty.
A third challenge to the reduction of
chronic poverty is the AIDS epidemic.
Research conducted in countries where the
epidemic is more advanced reveals the
numerous ways in which AIDS can devas-
tate households, during and beyond the
illness of infected household members.
Similar tragedies are presently being
experienced among South African house-
holds, but the full scale of the epidemic
has yet to be realised. The macroeconomic
effects of AIDS will also increasingly be
felt in the course of the next several years,
for example in diminishing government
resources available for social services and
investment, and in damaging the vitality of
the informal economy, a sector in which
many would-be SMMES would have been
expected to operate.
Notes
1 A notable exception, as indicated
above, is the Flagship Programme:
Developmental Programmes for
Unemployed Women with Children
Under Five Years.
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2 Government is preparing for this
process by putting in place training
programmes that will allow those
people who are retrenched to either
find jobs elsewhere or, mainly, set up
their own businesses. Sources indicate
however that the success rate of such
training programmes is at best 7 per
cent, meaning only 7 per cent of the
trainees manage to start SMMEs that
survive beyond the critical start-up
period. Supposing that all 1.2 million
retrenched individuals did enter self-
employment, this would represent an
implausible increase in that sector of
50–60 per cent.
5. Constraints and challenges to addressing chronic poverty
in South Africa
58
Study of the incidence and nature of chronic poverty and
 development policy in South Africa: An overview
Despite the wealth of informationabout poverty in South Africa,much remains to be learned about
chronic poverty specifically, and still more
remains to be learned before we can say
with any certainty how particular attention
to chronic poverty might figure in a coher-
ent, overarching anti-poverty strategy. We
conclude this paper by means of identify-
ing themes and research topics that, on the
basis of earlier sections, would appear to
be priority areas for a longer-term research
programme on chronic poverty.
Dynamic aspects of multiple livelihood
strategies. This is arguably the integrat-
ing, overarching theme of the entire
research programme. To the extent poor
households seek to survive and, where
possible, to improve their circumstances
by tapping into different sources of
sustenance, how do these strategies
evolve over time? A key aspect of this
theme is to track changes in assets and
entitlements over time, as well as
household composition, and to under-
stand the reasons for changes.
Role of social security grants. Social
security grants are recognised as vital to
keep individuals and households from
falling into total destitution, but they are
also controversial in that they can
allegedly create dependency and inhibit
initiative – thus maintaining chronic
poverty. Economic theory provides no
guidance on the matter. A number of
factors could be examined, including
the size of grants, the household mem-
ber to whom they are allocated, the
effects on household composition over
time, whether the grants provide a
source of investment, and their role in
the economy of the local community.
Access to and effects of government
and civil society programmes. Most
communities are touched by at least
some initiatives introduced to promote
development or expand economic
opportunities. They may originate with
the community, or they may be intro-
duced from outside. Among the key
issues that must be addressed are who
in the community is included in these
initiatives, what governs this process,
and how this impacts on the included
and the not-included.
The impact of government-funded
income generation projects. One of the
government’s most significant anti-
poverty interventions is the financing of
income-generation projects. To date, a
number of in-house evaluations of these
projects have been done, but these are
not generally publicly available, nor has
there been a summary or comparison of
these various evaluations in order to
better understand the impact of govern-
ment’s spending in this important area.
Assembling lessons learned to date,
with particular reference to issues such
as targeting, might provide a valuable
This study has sought to bring together what is known about chronic
poverty in South Africa, in part by summarising the small but important
literature that addresses chronic poverty directly, and in part by
selectively drawing together other strands of the literature on poverty.
The study has also aimed at providing an overview of anti-poverty
measures of government and civil society, and it has attempted to assess
the possible impact of these on the chronically poor.
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resource to the development commu-
nity generally.
Role of land, tenure patterns, and
agriculture. Land access forms a critical
part of households’ livelihood strategies
for those who have such access. How-
ever, land access is also vulnerable to
changes over time, and the benefits
themselves are also susceptible to
vagaries of weather, theft, and so on. A
key policy issue that could be directly
addressed within this research pro-
gramme is whether and in what way
land access benefits households whose
land use is of a part-time or subsistence
nature. The trend among provincial
departments of agriculture, for instance,
to assume that these forms of land use
are inappropriate or maintain house-
holds in poverty, must be closely
examined. At the same time, house-
holds with more than the average
amount of agricultural land should also
be studied, not least to assess their role
in stimulating the local economy,
which itself forms a key tenet of the
new Integrated Sustainable Rural
Development Strategy.
Dislocation, internal migration, and
social capital. Social exclusion has
been highlighted as an important factor
that can contribute to poverty and to an
inability to seize opportunities to escape
poverty. Different factors may contrib-
ute to social exclusion, but there is
scope for improving our understanding
of how these may arise and change
over time. Bekker et al. (1992) stress
that former farm workers in particular
are susceptible to chronic poverty,
because following retrenchment they
must typically resettle in areas where
they have no social network on which
to rely in times of stress. The continued
decline in employment in this important
sector over the past two decades has
meant that a large number of rural
people have been affected, especially
those in rural townships and nearby
squatter settlements. One important
research question is what these house-
holds do, if anything, to compensate for
the lack of social networks. Another
question is whether and to what extent
such networks can be built or re-built
over time, and how this is done. A third
question of immediate concern is what
avenues of re-deployment have been
discovered by retrenched farm workers,
and to what effect?
The effect of HIV/AIDS on households
and communities. What is the effect of
HIV/AIDS on household structure,
household welfare, internal migration,
and social support networks? The
present research programme offers an
opportunity to gain a better understand-
ing of the implications of AIDS for
poverty traps in the South African
context, with the potential to provide
critical lessons for policy formation.
Extrapolating to the question of inter-
generational poverty. Despite the
limited timeframe of the research pro-
gramme, it offers an opportunity to
examine the inter-generational aspect of
poverty. One possible approach to this
issue is to examine households’ atten-
tion to investing in the future of their
children. What conscious strategies are
adopted so as to promote the chances
that a child born to a poor household
will have a better future? What sacri-
fices are made, and according to what
expectations? What are the prospects
for these strategies being successful?
The political economy of poverty and
development policy in South Africa.
Especially since 1994, what has gov-
erned the evolution of South Africa’s
approach to addressing poverty? What
is responsible for the trend towards
‘developmental welfare’, and away
from grants and towards work-related
remuneration? What informs the bal-
ance struck between attention to urban
as opposed to rural areas? And what is
the relationship between the public
promises made by government, and the
means put into place to realise them?
6. Priority areas for research
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